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COMMENT
Applying a Strict Limitations Period to
RCRA Enforcement: A Toxic Concept
With Hazardous Results?
Timothy E. Shanley
Congress enacted the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act [RCRA] to deal with the safe and long
term disposal of our nations solid and hazardous wastes.
RCRA does not include a limitations period within its
statutory language. Various federal district and circuit
courts of appeal have applied the general five-year stat-
ute of limitations to civil penalties under other environ-
mental statutes. RCRA's goals and policies, however, dif-
fer from these statutes in many respects.
It is likely that the federal courts will also apply the
general federal five-year statute of limitations to RCRA
civil penalties. The author proposes that courts should
be cautious in applying a limitations period to the en-
forcement of RCRA civil penalties. The author further
points out the various events and tools which should toll
the running of a limitations period if a court should hold
that a limitations period does apply to RCRA civil pen-
alty enforcement.
Even if the courts do hold that RCRA civil penalties
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are limited by the general five-year statute of limita-
tions, this will not apply to RCRA's injunctive relief.
RCRA's injunctive relief will not be limited by such a
strict limitations period. The equitable doctrine of
laches, however, will likely apply to RCRA injunctive
relief.
I. Introduction
Preventing the improper disposal of hazardous waste is
one of the greatest problems facing our nation today. In the
past, hazardous waste has been improperly disposed of in
landfills and dump sites that were not adequately equipped or
licensed to accept these hazardous wastes. The discovery of
improperly stored or disposed of hazardous waste is hampered
by the fact that it may take years before such wastes begin to
leach into groundwater or aquifers, or present some other
identifiable environmental harm.
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act [RCRA]I is
the federal regulatory program designed to deal with the na-
tional hazardous waste problem. RCRA does not explicitly
state how long after improper storage, treatment or disposal
of waste the Environmental Protection Agency [EPA], citizen
groups, or states licensed to administer their own hazardous
waste programs2 may commence RCRA enforcement actions
1. RCRA §§ 1002-11012, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988).
2. Under RCRA, a itate may administer its own hazardous waste program in lieu
of the federal program as long as the state program is approved by the Administrator
of the EPA. RCRA § 3006, 42 U.S.C. § 6926 (1988). Actions taken by the states under
EPA approved state programs "shall have the same force and effect as action taken
by the Administrator .. " RCRA § 3006(d), 42 U.S.C. § 6926(d) (1988).
RCRA also does not totally preempt state and local regulation of hazardous
waste, unless these regulations actually conflict with federal law. Ensco, Inc. v. Du-
mas, 807 F.2d 743, 745 (8th Cir. 1986). RCRA's regulation of hazardous waste dispo-
sal was intended to establish minimum standards for the states and does not prevent
the states from imposing even more stringent regulations on hazardous waste dispo-
sal. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 376 A.2d 88 (N.J. 1977), rev'd on other
grounds, 437 U.S. 617, 620 (1978). (The Supreme Court held that RCRA did not
preempt state regulation of hazardous waste. However, since the New Jersey statute
banned nearly all out-of-state solid waste it violated the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution and was, therefore, void.) "To the contrary, Congress expressly has pro-
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against violators to compel cleanup measures and impose civil
penalties. Although recent court decisions have applied a gen-
eral five-year statute of limitations to the imposition of civil
penalties under some environmental statutes,s there are
strong practical and policy reasons why this five-year limita-
tions period should not apply to most cases involving the as-
sessment of civil penalties under RCRA.
A. Scope of Discussion
Part I of this comment will introduce the argument that a
limitations period should not apply to RCRA civil penalties."
Since Congress did not include a limitations period within the
RCRA language5 or refer to any limitations period in RCRA's
legislative history,6 the limitations period contained in 28
U.S.C. § 2462 should not apply to enforcement of civil penal-
ties under RCRA. RCRA's purpose and enforcement provi-
sions differ significantly from other environmental statutes to
which the general federal five-year limitations period has been
applied. 7
Part II of this article presents a broad overview of the
RCRA hazardous waste program. Part III introduces the pur-
poses of statutes of limitations and addresses the applicability
vided that the collection and disposal of solid wastes should continue to be primarily
the function of State, regional and local agencies .... City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. at 621 n.4. "A conflict exists when the local enactment 'stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.'" Id. at 621 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). Like-
wise, public nuisance claims under state law are not preempted by RCRA. See State
v. Monarch, 456 N.Y.S.2d 867, 869 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982). See generally WARREN
FREEDMAN, HAZARDOUS WASTE LIABILIrY § 14.21, at 204 (1992).
3. The general five-year statute of limitations can be found at 28 U.S.C. § 2462
(1988). Some federal courts have applied this limitations period to civil penalties
under the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act. See infra notes 75-84 and accom-
panying text.
4. It likewise should not apply to criminal fines, but that is beyond the scope of
this paper.
5. RCRA §§ 1002-11012, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988).
6. See 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6254 and the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5526-702.
7. Some federal district courts have applied the statute of limitations to citizen
suits under the Clean Water Act or Clean Air Act. See infra notes 75-84.
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of the general five-year federal statute of limitations for civil
penalties8 to RCRA's civil penalty provisions.' Specifically, it
will analyze possible application of the five-year limitation pe-
riod to judicial enforcement proceedings in the federal courts
and to EPA administrative enforcement proceedings. Part IV
explores both the differences and similarities that may affect
the use of the limitations provision in either proceeding.
Part V reviews several statute of limitations tolling theo-
ries applicable if the federal courts should decide that the lim-
itations period applies to RCRA enforcement actions for civil
penalties. Part V specifically discusses the discovery rule,
fraudulent concealment theory, the continuous violations the-
ory, and other procedural tools which can toll the running of
the statute of limitations on civil penalties or extend the cause
of action beyond five years.
Part VI determines the effect of 28 U.S.C. § 2462 on
EPA's remedial and injunctive relief provisions in RCRA. It
analyses RCRA's injunctive remedies and compares these ac-
tions to CERCLA's injunctive remedies.
II. Background of RCRA Hazardous Waste Regulation
A. The Purposes of RCRA
Congress enacted RCRA in 1976 to "eliminate[] the last
remaining loophole in environmental law, that of unregulated
land disposal of discarded materials and hazardous waste." 10
Before RCRA's enactment, up to ninety percent of all hazard-
ous waste was improperly disposed." One of RCRA's main
objectives is to "assure that hazardous waste management
practices are conducted in a manner which protects human
health and the environment"12 by establishing standards ap-
8. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1988).
9. RCRA § 3008, 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (1988).
10. H.R. REP. No. 1491, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6241.
11. ROGER W. FINDLEY & DANIEL A. FARBER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL
231 (3d ed. 1992) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL]. According to an
EPA sponsored study that had been conducted in 1983, one in seven generators of
hazardous waste were still disposing of their wastes illegally. Id.
12. RCRA § 1003(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(4) (1988).
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plicable to hazardous waste generators, transporters, and haz-
ardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities [here-
inafter TSD facilities].1 If hazardous waste generators,
transporters, and TSD facilities comply with the strict man-
dates of RCRA, it will reduce "the need for corrective action
at a future date."1
B. What is a RCRA Hazardous Waste?
Subtitle C of RCRA regulates the management of hazard-
ous waste and mandates that the EPA promulgate criteria
and regulations for identifying and listing hazardous wastes. 15
To qualify for regulation under RCRA, a waste must first be
classified as a solid waste."8 Once that prerequisite has been
met, the next step is to determine if the waste is hazardous
under RCRA and its regulations.
Congress lacked the expertise to identify hazardous
waste, so it broadly defined hazardous waste under RCRA1 7
13. RCRA §§ 3002(a), 3003(a), 3004(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6922(a), 6923(a), 6924(a)
(1988).
14. RCRA § 1003(a)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(5) (1988).
15. RCRA § 3001(a)-(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6921(a)-(b) (1988).
16. RCRA defines a solid waste as:
any garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply treat-
ment plant, or air pollution control facility and other discarded material, in-
cluding solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material resulting from
industrial, commercial, mining, and agricultural operations, and from com-
munity activities, but does not include solid or dissolved material in domestic
sewage, or solid or dissolved materials in irrigation return flows or industrial
discharges which are point sources subject to permits under section 1342 of
title 33 [Clean Water Act], or source, special nuclear, or byproduct material
as defined by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended ....
RCRA § 1004(27), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (1988).
The EPA has also promulgated a solid waste definition which is applicable only
to subtitle C of RCRA governing hazardous waste management. This definition states
materials are solid waste for subtitle C purposes if they are any discarded material
that is not specifically excluded by RCRA or by regulation, any materials which are
incinerated or burned, materials that are "accumulated, stored, or treated (but not
recycled) before or in lieu of being abandoned" by disposal, burning or incineration.
See 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(a)(1), (2)(i)-(iii), (b)(1)-(3), (c), (d) (1992). Certain materials
that are recycled, or constitute "inherently waste-like material" may also constitute
solid waste. Id.
17. See RCRA § 1004(5)(A), (B), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5)(A), (B) (1988) (statutory
definition of hazardous waste).
19921
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and directed the EPA to develop and promulgate criteria for
identifying hazardous wastes.18 The EPA followed this con-
gressional mandate by issuing regulations defining hazardous
wastes in 40 C.F.R. pt. 261.' s In general, a solid waste is a
hazardous waste if it meets one of the four criteria. A solid
waste is a hazardous waste if it is a listed hazardous waste
under 40 C.F.R. pt. 261, subpart D;20 a characteristic hazard-
ous waste under 40 C.F.R. pt. 261, subpart C;21 a mixture of a
solid and a hazardous waste;22 or "derived-from" the treat-
ment, storage, or disposal of a hazardous waste.2
18. RCRA § 3001(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6921(a) (1988). The EPA was directed to take
into account the waste's "toxicity, persistence, and degradability in nature, potential
for accumulation in tissue, and other related factors such as flammability, corrosive-
ness, and other hazardous characteristics." Id. The EPA was then directed to promul-
gate regulations for these wastes based on the section 3001(a) criteria. RCRA §
3001(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b) (1988). The EPA was further directed to "identify or list
those hazardous wastes which shall be subject to the provisions of this subchapter
solely because of the presence in such wastes of certain constituents (such as identi-
fied carcinogens, mutagens, or teratagens) at levels in excess of levels which endanger
human health." Id.
19. See generally 40 C.F.R. pt. 261, subparts C, D (1992).
20. RCRA § 3001(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b) (1988); see also 40 C.F.R. § 261.30-.33
(1992) (as mandated by RCRA, EPA has promulgated regulations listing solid wastes
which are considered hazardous).
21. RCRA § 3001(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b) (1988); see also 40 C.F.R. § 261.20-.24
(1991). The EPA promulgated, as directed by Congress, four hazardous waste charac-
teristics: ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity, and toxicity. RCRA § 3001(a), 42 U.S.C. §
6921(a) (1988); 40 C.F.R. § 261.21-.24 (1992).
22. Id. 40 C.F.R. § 261.3(a)(2)(iii)-(iv) (1992) (better known as the mixture rule).
Under the mixture rule, if any hazardous waste is commingled or mixed with a solid
waste the entire mixture is a hazardous waste. The mixture rule and the derived from
rule have recently been vacated for procedural violations of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act. See Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1991), reh'g denied, (Feb.
12, 1992). The EPA reissued the mixture and derived from rules on an interim basis
on February 18, 1992. 57 Fed. Reg. 7,628 (March 3, 1992). The agency is currently
working on new proposals for defining hazardous waste and may change the scope of
both the mixture and derived from rules. 57 Fed. Reg. 21,450-534 (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. § 261) (proposed May 20, 1992). The EPA has proposed two possible ap-
proaches: 1) the concentration based exemption criteria (CBEC) and 2) the expanded
characteristics option (ECHO). Id. This discussion is beyond the scope of this paper.
23. 40 C.F.R. § 261.3(c)(2)(i)-(ii) (1992) (better known as the derived-from rule);
see also supra note 22 (discussion regarding future of the derived from rule).
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C. RCRA Hazardous Waste Requirements
Once a solid waste is classified as hazardous, it is then
regulated under the strict confines of subtitle C of RCRA.
Subtitle C and the subsequent EPA regulations impose re-
strictions on hazardous waste generators, transporters, and
hazardous waste TSD facilities.2 4 It establishes a "cradle to
grave" hazardous waste management system which regulates
hazardous wastes from the point they are generated to their
final place of disposal. The "cradle to grave" objective is ac-
complished by requiring hazardous waste generators, trans-
porters, and TSD facilities to complete hazardous waste
manifests which the EPA can use to track the wastes from the
point they are generated to the point of final disposal.2 5
1. Subtitle C Requirements for Generators, Transport-
ers, and TSD Facilities
RCRA requires that the EPA promulgate regulations es-
tablishing standards which apply to hazardous waste genera-
tors,2 6 transporters, 27 and TSD facilities. 2  The EPA has
promulgated these regulations and they are published in the
Code of Federal Regulations2 9 The statute and regulations re-
quire that a hazardous waste generator maintain accurate rec-
ord-keeping and labeling practices, use appropriate contain-
ers, furnish information regarding "the general chemical
composition of such hazardous waste to persons transporting,
treating, storing or disposing of such wastes," comply with the
manifest system, and submit reports to the EPA once every
24. See RCRA §§ 3002, 3003, 3004, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6922, 6923, 6924 (1988).
25. RCRA § 3002(a)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 6922(a)(5) (1988); see also 40 C.F.R. §§
262.23, 263.20-.22, 264.71 (1992).
26. Section 3002(a) states that "the Administrator shall promulgate regulations
establishing such standards, applicable to generators of hazardous waste identified or
listed under this subchapter, as may be necessary to protect human health and the
environment." RCRA § 3002(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6922(a) (1988).
27. RCRA § 3003(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6923(a) (1988).
28. RCRA § 3004(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(a) (1988).
29. 40 C.F.R. pts. 262-264 (1992) (standards applicable to generators, transport-
ers, and TSD facilities).
1992]
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two years."0
RCRA and the EPA regulations require hazardous waste
transporters to maintain records regarding the hazardous
waste they transport, the sources of the hazardous waste they
transport, and the delivery points of such waste.31 Transport-
ers are also required to comply with the hazardous waste la-
beling requirements and the hazardous waste manifest
system.3
Owners and operators of TSD facilities are required to
maintain adequate records of all hazardous waste which their
facility treats, stores, or disposes of and the manner in which
the wastes were treated, stored, or disposed.s Owners and op-
erators of TSD facilities must also comply with reporting,
monitoring, and inspection requirements; the manifest sys-
tem; the EPA's treatment, storage, and disposal operating
methods, techniques, and practices; the location, design and
construction requirements; the contingency plan require-
ments; operation and ownership requirements; and the permit
requirements contained in section 3005. 3"
D. RCRA Civil Penalties
RCRA authorizes the imposition of civil penalties for vio-
lations of the hazardous waste management requirements dis-
cussed in the previous section.3 5 Individuals who violate these
hazardous waste requirements can be held liable for large civil
penalties. RCRA allows the government to recover "$25,000
30. RCRA § 3002(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6922(a) (1988); 40 C.F.R. pt. 262 (1992).
31. See RCRA § 3003(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6923(a)(2) (1988); see also 40 C.F.R. pt.
263 (1992) (regulations promulgated for hazardous waste transporters).
32. See RCRA § 3003(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6923(a)(2) (1988); see also 40 C.F.R. pt.
263 (1992).
33. RCRA § 3004(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(a)(1) (1988).
34. RCRA § 3004(a)(2)-(7), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(a)(2)-(7) (1988); see 40 C.F.R. pt.
264 (1992) (EPA regulatory standards applicable to owners and operators of TSD
facilities). TSD facilities must obtain a permit for the treatment, storage or disposal
of hazardous waste. RCRA § 3005, 42 U.S.C. § 6925 (1988) (permit requirements); see
also 40 C.F.R. pt. 270 (1992) (regulations governing the permitting program and the
requirements for a permit).
35. RCRA § 3008(g), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(g) (1988). For a brief discussion of the
hazardous waste requirements under RCRA see supra part II.C.
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for each such violation," and each day of violation "consti-
tutes a separate violation."' 6 The EPA can also recover
"$25,000 for each day of violation" for violations of EPA com-
pliance orders3 7 and corrective action orders.3 8 In addition,
EPA can assess a civil penalty against a RCRA violator in ei-
ther an administrative or judicial forum. 9
III. Statute of Limitations Overview
A. Purposes of a Limitations Period
The purpose of a statute of limitations is "to prevent
plaintiffs from sleeping on their rights." ° Limitation periods
are intended to put a defendant on notice of an adversary's
claim.41 Furthermore, statutes of limitations promote the no-
tion that adversaries shall be put on notice to defend within a
specific period of time.42 "[T]he right to be free of stale claims
in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them. '43
Limitations periods "although affording plaintiffs what
the legislature deems a reasonable time to present their
claims, protect[] defendants and the courts from cases in
which the search for truth may be seriously impaired by the
loss of evidence, whether by death or disappearances of wit-
nesses, fading memories, disappearance of documents, or oth-
36. RCRA § 3008(g), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(g) (1988) (emphasis added).
37. RCRA § 3008(c), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(c) (1988) (emphasis added).
38. RCRA § 3008(h)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(h)(2) (1988).
39. See RCRA § 3008(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(1) (1988) and RCRA § 3008(g),
42 U.S.C. § 6928(g) (1988). Section 3008(g) fails to note whether this civil penalty
provision applies to the judicial or administrative forum. The wording "liable to the
United States" may assist in determining the appropriate forum for assessing section
3008(g) civil penalties. "Because it is the United States which sues for penalties in
court and the Administrator who assesses penalties administratively, the wording is
highly suggestive that courts are to assess penalties under section 3008(g)." SHELDON
M. NOVICK, LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION § 8.01(5)(c)(i) (1992).
40. Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 352 (1983).
41. Id.
42. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (held that the two-year
limitations period contained in the Federal Torts Claim Act barred plaintiff's suit
which was commenced after two years).
43. Id. at 117 (quoting Railroad Tel. v. Railroad Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342,
349 (1944)).
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erwise."" Statutes of limitations, similar to the doctrine of
laches, promote justice by preventing surprises caused by "the
revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evi-
dence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have
disappeared."
If Congress puts a specific time limit in a statute, then
the matter is concluded and the congressional statute of limi-
tations is definite.4'6 However, Congress may create a cause of
action and not prescribe a time limit on when the action may
be brought.47 Courts should not construe a statute of limita-
tions so as to reach an absurd result or a result which was not
intended by Congress.4 8
B. Which Limitations Period May Apply
1. State versus Federal Law
Generally when a federal statute lacks a limitations pe-
riod for a cause of action arising under such statute, the fed-
eral courts will apply the most relevant limitations period
under state law. 9 One exception to this rule, however, is if the
application of the state limitations period would frustrate the
goals of Congress or cause a lack of uniformity in enforce-
ment50 "Especially where there is a relevant federal statute of
44. Id.
45. Railroad Tel. v. Railroad Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944).
46. Saffron v. Department of the Navy, 561 F.2d 938, 941 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(citing Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946)).
47. United States v. Lutheran Medical Ctr., 524 F. Supp. 421 (D.C. Neb. 1981),
aff'd, 680 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1982). See also Occidental Life Ins. v. EEOC, 432 U.S.
355, 367 (1977).
48. Wenning v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 110, 112 (D.C. Ind. 1978)
(quoting Hamtrick v. Indianapolis Humane Soc'y, 174 F. Supp. 403, 409 (S.D. Ind.
1959), aff'd, 273 F.2d 7 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 919 (1960)).
49. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975).
50. DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 161 (1983).
"[Wihere state statutes of limitation are 'unsatisfactory vehicles for the enforcement
of federal law ..., it may be inappropriate to conclude that Congress would choose to
adopt state rules at odds with the purpose or operation of federal substantive law.' "
Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913
F.2d 64, 74 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 161); see also Occidental
Life Ins. Co., 432 U.S. at 367.
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limitations, courts need not borrow from state law."'" Since
state legislatures do not devise their limitations periods with
national interests in mind, a federal court will not mechani-
cally apply a state statute of limitations where a federal stat-
ute lacks its own limitations period.5 2
Most federal case law has consistently applied the federal
five-year statute of limitations contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2462
to the enforcement of civil penalties under the Clean Water
Act, the Clean Air Act, and the Rivers and Harbors Act."'
These decisions rejected the application of a state limitations
period on the grounds that it would create inconsistencies in
federal enforcement.5' There would be no uniformity in en-
forcement from state to state if a state limitations applied."
51. Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v. Powell Duffryn Terminals,
Inc., 913 F.2d at 74; see also Occidental Life Ins. Co., 432 U.S. at 367; Johnson v.
Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. at 462; Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,
834 F.2d 1517, 1521 (9th Cir. 1987).
52. Sierra Club v. Chevron, 834 F.2d at 1521.
53. See infra notes 75-84. The New Jersey District Court had held that the gen-
eral federal five-year limitations did not apply to the enforcement of civil penalties
under the Clean Water Act. Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v. United
States Metals Refining Co., 681 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.N.J. 1987); Student Public In-
terest Research Group of New Jersey v. AT&T Bell Labs., 617 F. Supp. 1190, 1202(D.N.J. 1985); Student Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v. Tenneco
Polymers, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1394, 1398-99 (D.N.J. 1985); but see Public Interest Re-
search Group of New Jersey v. Witco Chem. Corp., 31 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1571,
1579 (D.N.J. May 17, 1990) (this decision applied the general federal five-year limita-
tions period to civil penalties under the Clean Water Act). The Third Circuit, how-
ever, overruled the New Jersey District Court decisions which held that no limita-
tions period applied to the enforcement of civil penalties under the Clean Water Act.
See Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals,
Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 74 (3d Cir. 1990) (the five-year limitations period contained in 28
U.S.C. § 2462 applies to citizen suits under the Clean Water Act); see also infra notes
75-84.
54. Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v. Powell Duffryn Terminals,
Inc., 913 F.2d at 74; Sierra Club v. Chevron, 834 F.2d at 1522; see also infra notes 75-
84.
55. Sierra Club v. Chevron, 834 F.2d at 1522. This case held that 28 U.S.C. §
2462 applied to both the United States Government and to citizen suit enforcement
under the Clean Water Act. The defendant had argued that the three-year California
limitations period should apply to this citizen suit. The Ninth Circuit held that ap-
plying a different limitations period to citizens under the act: (1) would limit citizens
ability to monitor EPA enforcement; and (2) would result in lack of uniformity of
enforcement from state to state. Id. These concerns would "only lead to confusion
and diminish the effective enforcement of the Clean Water Act." Id.
1992]
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One court was also concerned that using a state limitations
period would cause some states to adjust their limitations pe-
riod to either become "very hospitable to industries that vio-
late the Act" or "provide a more hostile attitude towards pos-
sible polluters." 6
If a court is to hold that a limitations period does apply
to enforcement of RCRA civil penalties, the court's reasoning
will likely be based on case precedent which has applied 28
U.S.C. § 2462 to the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act.
Therefore, if a court holds that a limitations period does ap-
ply to enforcement of RCRA civil penalties, then the court
should apply the five-year limitations period and not a rele-
vant state limitations period.
2. The Federal Five-Year Statute of Limitations for
Civil Penalties, Fines, and Forfeitures
The general five-year federal statute of limitations for
civil fines, penalties, and forfeitures contained in 28 U.S.C. §
2462 states:
Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, an ac-
tion, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil
fine, penalty or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, shall
not be entertained unless commenced within five years
from the date when the claim first accrued if, within the
same period, the offender or the property is found within
the United States in order that proper service may be
made thereon.5 7
The federal "courts have long held that the United States
is not bound by any limitations period unless Congress explic-
itly directs otherwise." 8 This notion is "derive[d] from the
common law principle that immunity from limitations periods
56. Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 608 F. Supp. 440, 447 (D.
Md. 1985).
57. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1988).
58. United States v. City of Palm Beach Gardens, 635 F.2d 337, 339 (5th Cir.
1981) (citations omitted).
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is an essential prerogative of sovereignty."5 9 When a statute of
limitations is sought to be applied against the rights of the
United States Government, the courts generally strictly con-
strue such claims 0 in favor of the government.6
3. RCRA Contains No Limitations Period
RCRA does not contain a limitations period within its
statutory language and gives no indication of whether a limi-
tations period applies to enforcement of RCRA civil penalties.
Congress has given very little guidance, if any, on this issue.
Furthermore, the legislative history is ambiguous as to
whether Congress had intended a limitations period to apply
to RCRA enforcement actions brought by either the EPA, an
environmental citizens group, or a state environmental agency
with an approved RCRA enforcement program, seeking civil
penalties from alleged RCRA violators.62
59. Id.; see also Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 132-33 (1938)
(the general rule is that statutes of limitations do not ordinarily run against the
United States). "The rule quod nullum tempus occurrit regi - that the sovereign is
exempt from the consequences of its laches, and from the operation of statutes of
limitations - appears to be a vestigial survival of the prerogative of the Crown." Id.
at 132 (citations omitted).
60. In United States v. Davio, 136 F. Supp. 423, 427 (E.D. Mich. 1955), the court
found that the limitations period contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2462 must be strictly con-
strued by the courts. This case involved an action commenced by the U.S. Govern-
ment under the Anti-Kickback Act against a subcontractor. The government sought
to recover from the subcontractor the illegal kickbacks that the subcontractor paid to
the contractor to receive numerous subcontracts. The contractor was a prime contrac-
tor with the United States Army Air Force. The subcontractor raised 28 U.S.C. §
2462 as an affirmative defense. The court held that the Government's recovery was
not a civil penalty, but a civil damage recovery, and thus, the limitations period con-
tained in 28 U.S.C. § 2462 did not apply to this recovery. United States v. Davio, 136
F. Supp. at 426.
61. "Statutes of limitation sought to be applied to bar rights of the Government,
must receive a strict construction in favor of the Government." Badaracco v. Com-
missioner, 464 U.S. 386, 391 (1984) (quoting E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Davis,
264 U.S. 456, 462 (1924)). The Badaracco case involved the application of a three-
year statute of limitation contained in the Internal Revenue Code and held that the
limitations period did not apply where a false or fraudulent return was filed with the
intent to evade taxes. Id. In E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., the Court strictly con-
strued a limitations period contained in the Transportation Act of 1920. E.I. Dupont
de Nemours & Co. v. Davis, 264 U.S. at 456.
62. See RCRA §§ 1002-11012, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991k (1988); see also 1976
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4. Courts Have Yet To Apply a Limitations Period to
Actions For RCRA Civil Penalties
To date, the issue of applying a limitations period to
RCRA civil penalty actions has not been decided in any fed-
eral court. The federal courts have indicated that a limitations
period may apply to RCRA civil penalty enforcement actions
brought by either the EPA or environmental citizens groups.6 3
Administrative decisions suggest that the five-year statute of
limitations may apply to assessment of civil penalties in EPA
administrative adjudicatory proceedings."
When the EPA is given the opportunity, it will most
likely argue that the limitations period should not apply to its
enforcement actions under RCRA.e5 However, the EPA should
wait until it has a strong case before it argues that the limita-
tions period does not apply to RCRA civil penalties.
When the EPA has knowledge of a RCRA violation and
sits on those rights for more than five years, the limitations
period should apply to limit its recovery of civil penalties, but
only for the penalties the EPA sought to recover during the
period of delay. Since the EPA will not likely be barred from
bringing an injunctive action to alleviate an imminent and
substantial endangerment to human health and the environ-
ment caused by an illegal disposal of hazardous waste, and
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6254 and the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-616, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576-5702.
63. See infra notes 75-84.
64. See infra part IV.B.
65. RCRA is concerned with the safe disposal and storage of hazardous waste
over a lengthy period of time. RCRA's objective is to require "that hazardous waste
be properly managed in the first instance thereby reducing the need for corrective
action at a future date . . . ." RCRA § 1003(a)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(5) (1988).
Hazardous wastes retain their hazardous characteristics over a lengthy period of time,
and their effects are not readily detectable. It may take many years after the five-year
limitations period has expired before the illegally disposed of hazardous waste con-
tainers begin to leak and leach into groundwater or run-off into a water body where
they may be detected. To hold that injunctive relief or civil penalties are time barred
would frustrate the goals of Congress that "assur[e] that hazardous waste manage-
ment practices are conducted in a manner which protects human health and the envi-
ronment . . ." and "requir[e] that hazardous waste be properly managed in the first
instance thereby reducing the need for corrective action at a future date .... " RCRA
§ 1003(a)(4), (5), 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(4), (5) (1988).
[Vol. 10
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol10/iss1/9
RCRA ENFORCEMENT
both actions involve substantially the same evidence, it should
also be able to collect civil penalties as a deterrent to future
illegal conduct.
The typical situation will involve a defendant who im-
properly disposed of hazardous waste either because the de-
fendant ignored the hazardous waste manifest system or in-
correctly determined that the waste was not hazardous.16 If
the limitations provision applied in these circumstances, it
would encourage hazardous waste generators, transporters, or
owners and operators of TSD facilities to violate the law by
disposing of waste illegally and claiming no civil penalty lia-
bility after the limitations period has run. That clearly was
not a congressional objective of RCRA.
RCRA actions will probably increase in future years as
concerns for environmental protection and safe disposal of
hazardous waste increase. The limitations period issue needs
to be resolved because the EPA, state environmental agencies,
and environmental citizens groups have limited enforcement
resources; they cannot afford to waste those resources by
bringing enforcement actions which may later be held to be
time-barred and dismissed. Hazardous waste generators,
transporters, and owners or operators of TSD facilities also
need the issue resolved to know whether they have a valid af-
firmative defense against enforcement actions for civil penal-
ties brought by the EPA, a state, or a citizens group.
IV. Will a Limitation Period Apply to RCRA Civil Penalty
Actions?
A. Judicial Proceedings in Federal Court
To date, no court has placed a limitation period on RCRA
civil penalties. More specifically, the federal courts have not
yet decided whether 28 U.S.C. § 2462 or any other limitations
period applies to RCRA civil penalty enforcement actions. In
66. The failure of a generator to properly identify a hazardous waste may mean
that this waste will never be included in the "cradle to grave" management program
under RCRA. This could result in improper disposal or management of the waste
which would subject the generator to liability. RIDGEWAY M. HALL, JR. ET AL., RCRA
HAZARDOUS WASTES HANDBOOK 4-1 (7th ed. 1987).
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United States v. Hardage, however, the district court sug-
gested that some sort of limitations period should apply to
RCRA and CERCLA enforcement actions.6 7 This court, how-
ever, did not indicate what limitations period might or should
apply. 6 The Hardage case only held that the defendant's
statute of limitations defense was not subject to the govern-
ment's motion to strike on the grounds that it involved mixed
questions of law and fact." The court gave no indication that
the five-year federal statute of limitations or any other spe-
cific limitations period applied to RCRA civil penalties.7 0 This
case, therefore, does not assist in answering the limitations
question that is very likely to arise in the near future.
No other court in the federal system has suggested that
RCRA is subject to the limitations provision of 28 U.S.C. §
2462. The Hardage case gives only a limited view of how one
district court may eventually decide the issue. Nor has any
federal appellate court held or given any indication that the
general federal five-year statute of limitations for civil penal-
ties, fines or forfeitures71 applies to RCRA enforcement ac-
tions. To determine how the courts may eventually decide this
issue, it is necessary to discuss how the limitations period for
civil penalties72 has been applied to other federal environmen-
tal statutes and various other federal statutes authorizing civil
penalty enforcement.
67. United States v. Hardage, 116 F.R.D. 460, 467 (W.D. Okla. 1987). Since the
EPA may have had notice of the violations the court was "not satisfied [that] the
Government may bring an action under the provisions of CERCLA [Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act] or RCRA without regard
to the timeliness thereof." Id.
68. Id. The court did not believe that the government could wait and bring a
RCRA or CERCLA enforcement action whenever it felt like it. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. The court stated that "the defendant must be allowed to develop the
facts, and the court must have the opportunity to settle legal issues, prior to making a
determination as to this defense." Id. It appears that the court was concerned that
the Government had unduly delayed and possibly prejudiced the defendants. With-
out a factual record the court could not decide the limitations issues. The court may
have been considering the doctrine of laches or a statute of limitations but it failed to
state it in the opinion.
71. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1988).
72. Id.
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1. Application of the Limitation Period to Other Envi-
ronmental Statutes
Some federal district and circuit courts of appeal have
held that the general federal five-year statute of limitations"
was applicable to other environmental statutes that were also
silent on the limitations period issue .7  Numerous federal
court decisions have held that the five-year limitations period
applied to citizen suits under the Clean Water Act.75 These
decisions were based on the reasoning that 28 U.S.C. § 2462
applied to actions asserted on behalf of the United States and
to qui tam actions.7 6 Since plaintiffs who bring citizen suits
under the Clean Water Act "effectively represent the United
States," their suits are also subject to the federal statute of
limitations.7 7 Under the Clean Water Act's citizen suit provi-
73. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1988).
74. See infra notes 75-84.
75. Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. (NJPIRG) v. Powell Duf-
fryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 74 (3d Cir. 1990) (the five-year limitations period
contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2462 applies to citizen suits under the Clean Water Act),
overruling Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v. United States Metals
Refining Co., 681 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.N.J. 1987) (five-year limitations period con-
tained in 28 U.S.C. § 2462 did not apply to civil penalties under the Clean Water
Act); Student Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v. AT&T Bell Labs., 617
F. Supp. 1190, 1202 (D.N.J. 1985) (same); Student Public Interest Research Group of
New Jersey v. Tenneco Polymers, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1394, 1398-99 (D.N.J. 1985)
(same); see also Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 834 F.2d 1517, 1521 (9th Cir.
1987) (the five-year limitations period contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2462 applies to citizen
suits under the Clean Water Act); Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey
(NJPIRG) v. Witco Chem. Corp., 31 Env't Cas. Rep. (BNA) 1571, 1579 (D.N.J. May
17, 1990) (same); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumer Power Co., 657 F. Supp. 989,
1010 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1988);
Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp., 635 F. Supp. 284, 287
(N.D.N.Y. 1986) (same); Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 608 F.
Supp. 440, 450 (D. Md. 1985) (same); Sierra Club v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 617 F.
Supp. 1120, 1125 (D. Md. 1985) (same); Connecticut Fund for the Env't v. Job Plat-
ing Co., 623 F. Supp. 207, 213 (D. Conn. 1985) (same); Friends of the Earth v. Facet
Enters., Inc., 618 F. Supp. 532, 536 (W.D.N.Y. 1984) (same).
76. Sierra Club v. Chevron, 834 F.2d at 1522. "A qui tam action is a civil pro-
ceeding in which an informer sues for the Government, as well as for himself, to re-
cover a penalty under a particular statute." Id. at 1522 n.3; see also Sierra Club v.
Andrus, 610 F.2d 581, 591 n.17 (9th Cir. 1979).
77. NJPIRG v. Witco Chem. Corp., 31 Env't Cas. Rep. (B.N.A.) at 1579-80.
I
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sion 7 8 citizens act as adjuncts to government enforcement ac-
tions and "effectively stand in the shoes of the EPA . . . .
Imposing a different limitations period to citizen suits than
the limitations period that applies to the United States Gov-
ernment would frustrate national policies.80 Court decisions
have, therefore, reasoned that since the EPA's (the United
States Government) enforcement actions under the Clean
Water Act were subject to the five-year limitations period,81
"citizens should be subject to the same limitations period as
the government.""
The limitations period has also been applied to civil pen-
alty enforcement under the Clean Air Act8" and the Rivers
and Harbors Act. 4 No federal court, however, has ever ap-
plied a limitations period to RCRA civil penalties.8 5
2. No Limitations Period Should Apply to RCRA Civil
Penalties
RCRA's purposes and objectives differ significantly from
these statutes to which the limitations period has been ap-
plied. RCRA addresses the long-term and permanent disposal
of hazardous wastes.8 6 It is concerned with the safe disposal of
these wastes so that one day CERCLA's Super Fund clean-up
78. CWA § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988).
79. See NJPIRG v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, 913 F.2d at 74; see also Sierra
Club v. Chevron, 834 F.2d 1522.
80. Sierra Club v. Chevron, 834 F.2d at 1521-22.
81. United States v. Hobbs, 736 F. Supp. 1406, 1409 (E.D. Va. 1990) (limitations
period contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2462 applies to the United States Government's ac-
tions for civil penalties under the Clean Water Act); United States v. Sharon Steel
Corp., 30 Env't Cas. Rep. (BNA) 1778, 1780 (N.D. Ohio 1989) (same); see also Sierra
Club v. Chevron, 834 F.2d at 1521-22.
82. NJPIRG v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, 913 F.2d at 74 (since the limitations
period contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2462 applies to the United States Government's ac-
tions for civil penalties under the Clean Water Act it also applies to citizen suits); see
also supra note 75 and accompanying text.
83. United States v. SCM Corp., 667 F. Supp. 1110, 1123 (D. Md. 1987).
84. United States v. Central Soya, Inc., 697 F.2d 165, 169 (7th Cir. 1982).
85. See supra subparts III.B.3, 4.
86. RCRA § 1003, 42 U.S.C. § 6902 (1988). RCRA's objective is aimed at "reduc-
ing the need for corrective action at a later date." See RCRA § 1003(5), 42 U.S.C. §
6902(5) (1988).
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list will prove unnecessary. 7
The Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act govern the
emission of pollutants from the stack and point sources, re-
spectively. Whereas RCRA regulates the disposal of hazardous
and solid waste over an extended period of time, the Clean
Water Act and the Clean Air Act regulate specific discharges
from discrete and visible point sources.se
Violations of the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act are
generally readily detectable by the EPA, state environmental
agencies and citizen groups. Unpermitted releases immedi-
ately enter the atmosphere and the navigable waters of the
United States and can generally be traced back to the violator
quickly and accurately. Both Acts have mandatory monitoring
requirements establishing that violations be reported either
through Discharge Monitoring Reports (DMRs) or Continu-
ous Emissions Monitoring Reports (CEMRs).
The same, however, does not hold true for violations of
RCRA. The average life of a disposal site is approximately
twenty years.89 The illegal disposal of a hazardous waste can
remain undetected in the environment by the government and
the public for many years to come.
The application of the five-year statute of limitations to
RCRA would impede the congressional purpose of RCRA to
regulate the disposal of hazardous waste over a lengthy period
87. CERCLA and its implementing regulations directly complement the RCRA
hazardous waste program. RIDGEWAY M. HALL, JR. ET AL., RCRA HAZARDOUS WASTES
HANDBOOK 1-7 (7th ed. 1987). In theory, if RCRA provisions are complied with, then
future CERCLA Super Fund sites can be avoided since the waste will have been al-
legedly disposed of in an environmentally sound manner. On the other hand, if
RCRA is violated and the waste goes undetected, the site may later become a Super
Fund site and subject potentially responsible parties (PRPs) to liability for CERCLA
clean-up costs, not to mention RCRA liability. "Unless RCRA's solid and hazardous
waste programs are properly enforced and implemented, we are doing little more than
grooming Super Fund stites [sic) of the future." Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act Reauthorization: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Transportation,
and Tourism of the House of Representatives Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. at 398 (1982).
88. EPA has promulgated regulations under RCRA which include the monitoring
and reporting for a period of 30 years after the time of disposal. 40 C.F.R. §
264.117(a)(1) (1992).
89. See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL, supra note 11, at 232.
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of time. Subjecting a generator, transporter, or TSD facility to
CERCLA response costs and to RCRA civil penalties would
act as a further deterrent to illegal disposal of hazardous
waste. A potential violator of RCRA's hazardous waste re-
quirements would think twice before committing the viola-
tion, knowing he would be subject to both RCRA and CER-
CLA liability in the future.
B. EPA Administrative Proceedings Under RCRA: Will 28
U.S.C. § 2462 Apply?
1. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
An additionally unclear question is whether the general
five-year federal statute of limitations applies to administra-
tive civil penalties assessed by the EPA in an administrative
forum. Although administrative law judges (ALJs) follow a
different set of procedural rules than the federal courts, fed-
eral court procedural holdings are influential to an ALJ's final
decision.90 The EPA's administrative law decisions suggest
that the limitations period contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2462 ap-
plies to RCRA enforcement actions.
In In re Adolph Coors Co.,01 ALJ Nissen held that the
civil penalty limitations period contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2462
90. "Although not binding, federal court decisions interpreting the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure (FRCP) are useful guides in interpreting the Consolidated Rules of
Practice." In re Adolph Coors Co., No. RCRA-VIII-90-09 (March 1, 1991). Adminis-
trative and judicial decisions have reasoned that:
In considering the motion to strike the statute of limitations defense, it
should be noted that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Fed. R. Civ. P.)
do not govern the procedure in administrative agencies which are free to
fashion their own rules of procedure, so long as those rules satisfy the funda-
mental requirements of fairness and notice .... Nevertheless, consideration
of that practice and precedent may provide some insights which could be
helpful in disposing of the motion.
In re Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. (3M Co.), No. TSCA-88-H-06, 1989 WL 253236
(E.P.A.), at *3 (Aug. 7, 1989) (citing Katzon Bros., Inc. v. EPA, 839 F.2d 1396, 1399
(10th Cir. 1988)). See also Silverman v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 549
F.2d 28, 33 (7th Cir. 1977); Hess & Clark v. F.D.A., 495 F.2d 975, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
South Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 570 F. Supp. 227, 232 (D.
La. 1983), afl'd, 744 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. 1984); Federal Communications Comm'n. v.
Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 143 (1940).
91. In re Adolph Coors Co., No. RCRA-VIII-90-09 (Mar. 1, 1991).
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applied to RCRA administrative penalty actions.2 The court
reasoned that if the limitations period was applicable to judi-
cial enforcement actions then it should likewise be applied to
administrative enforcement.' 3
However, this reasoning is flawed and unsupported by
federal case law because no federal court has held that 28
U.S.C. § 2462 applied to judicial enforcement of RCRA civil
penalties. The ALJ's decision was based on federal court deci-
sions which applied section 2462 to the Clean Water Act, the
Clean Air Act and some non-environmental statutes.9 4 In the
Coors decision, ALJ Nissen concluded that because the limita-
tions period had been applied to the Clean Water Act, the
federal courts would also apply the statute of limitations to
RCRA." Although this may eventually turn out to be the
case, this situation has not yet occurred and the ALJ failed to
recognize this fact in his opinion.
In In re J.V. Peters & Co., Inc.,6 the Chief Judicial Of-
ficer (CJO), without holding that the limitations period ap-
plies to the EPA's administrative civil penalty assessment
proceeding under RCRA, held that the "relation back" rule97
precluded the use of the statute of limitations as a defense.' 8
The "relation back" rule allows a plaintiff to amend his com-
plaint to include other parties after the initial limitations pe-
riod has run if the amended complaint contains the same
cause of action as the original complaint." The "relation
back" rule requires that four conditions be met. First, the ba-
92. Id. at 22.
93. Id. at 21.
94. Id. at 16.
95. Id. The A.J in this case, although holding that 28 U.S.C. § 2462 applies to
administratively assessed civil penalties under RCRA, held that the limitations pe-
riod did not bar the present action. Since the limitations period did not begin to run
against the claim until the violation was discovered, and not when the violation oc-
curred, the action was rightfully brought within five years of discovery and, therefore,
was not time barred. See infra part V.B. for an explanation of the discovery rule.
96. In re J.V. Peters & Co., RCRA No. V-W-81-R-75, 1990 WL 303851 (E.P.A.)
(Aug. 7, 1990) (final decision).
97. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c).
98. In re J.V. Peters & Co., RCRA No. V-W-81-R-75, 1990 WL 303851 (E.P.A.),
at *4 (Aug. 7, 1990) (final decision).
99. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c).
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sic claim must have arisen out of the conduct set forth in the
original pleading. 100 Second, the party to be brought in must
have received notice so the party will not be prejudiced in
maintaining or presenting a defense. 10 1 Third, the party must
or should have known that but for a mistake concerning iden-
tity, the action would have been brought against them.102 Fi-
nally, the second and third requirements must have been ful-
filled within the prescribed limitations period, in this case five
years.103
In In re J. V. Peters, the EPA found numerous violations
during an inspection in December 1980.104 When the viola-
tions were found, the company was a partnership. Two weeks
later, the partnership dissolved and transferred all its assets
to the J.V. Peters Company, Inc.10 5 EPA filed suit against the
corporation on April 17, 1981.106 On May 12, 1981, the corpo-
ration admitted to most of the RCRA violations that the EPA
had filed against it. 07 In 1984, however, the corporation
moved to dismiss the actions on the grounds that the corpora-
tion did not exist when the violations occurred and, therefore,
claimed it was not liable for such violations.108
In 1985, the Presiding Officer held that the corporation,
the partnership, and Shillman were jointly and severally lia-
ble.109 On appeal, the CJO reversed the Presiding Officer's
joint and several liability finding on the grounds that the
partnership and Shillman were not parties in the proceeding
and the corporation was not a proper party to these proceed-
ings.110 The CJO granted the corporation's motion to dismiss
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. In re J.V. Peters & Co., No. RCRA V-W-81-R-75, 1990 WL 303851 (E.P.A.),
at *1 (Aug. 7, 1990) (final decision).
105. Id. at *1.
106. Id. at *2.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. In re J.V. Peters & Co., RCRA No. V-W-81-R-75, 1985 WL 57141 (E.P.A.),
at *15 (May 15, 1985) (initial decision).
110. In re J.V. Peters & Co., RCRA No. V-W-81-R-75, 1986 WL 69028 (E.P.A.),
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and remanded the decision back to the Presiding Officer.11 '
The CJO, however, allowed the EPA to amend its complaint
to include both Shillman and the partnership as defend-
ants. 11 The EPA's amended complaint included the corpora-
tion, the partnership, and Shillman and its allegations were
based on the Presiding Officer's previous ruling on May 8,
1985.113 The defendants denied the violations and asserted the
general federal five-year statute of limitations on civil penal-
ties as an affirmative defense to the charges. 1 '
In 1988, the Presiding Officer held that the statute of lim-
itations did not apply to RCRA enforcement actions and that
Shillman and the partnership were liable jointly and severally,
as owners and operators, for $25,000 dollars in civil penal-
ties. ' 15 The parties appealed the Presiding Officer's ruling and
again asserted the statute of limitations as an affirmative de-
fense.1 ' The final decision held that even assuming that the
statute of limitations does apply,1 it does not apply in this
at *6 (May 9, 1986) (remand of the Presiding Officer's joint and several liability hold-
ing on May 15, 1985).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See In re J.V. Peters & Co., RCRA No. V-W-81-R-75, 1988 WL 236321
(E.P.A.) (Sept. 26, 1988) (initial decision, order on remand); see also In re J.V. Peters
& Co., No. RCRA V-W-81-R-75, 1990 WL 303851 (E.P.A.), at *2 (Aug. 7, 1990) (final
decision).
114. See In re J.V. Peters & Co., RCRA No. V-W-81-R-75, 1988 WL 236321
(E.P.A.), at *5 (Sept. 26, 1988) (initial decision, order on remand); see also In re J.V.
Peters & Co., No. RCRA V-W-81-R-75, 1990 WL 303851 (E.P.A.), at *2 (Aug. 7,
1990) (final decision).
115. See In re J.V. Peters & Co., RCRA No. V-W-81-R-75, 1988 WL 236321
(E.P.A.), at *5, 6 (Sept. 26, 1988) (initial decision, order on remand); see also In re
J.V. Peters & Co., No. RCRA V-W-81-R-75, 1990 WL 303851 (E.P.A.), at *2 (Aug. 7,
1990) (final decision).
116. In re J.V. Peters & Co., No. RCRA V-W-81-R-75, 1990 WL 303851 (E.P.A.),
at *2 (Aug. 7, 1990) (final decision).
117. In re J.V. Peters & Co., No. RCRA V-W-81-R-75, 1990 WL 303851 (E.P.A.),
at *4 (Aug. 7, 1990) (final decision). The final decision did not address whether the
limitations period contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2462 applied to administrative assessment
of civil penalties under RCRA. It side-stepped the issue by saying that even if it
applies in other situations it does not apply to the case at bar since the present action
relates back to the previous action. This may suggest that the limitations period does
apply since it would have been easier for the ALJ to hold that the limitations period
does not apply. It may also suggest that the courts and the ALJ's will side-step the
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case due to the "relation back" rule." 8 This decision, however,
did not indicate that the statute of limitations applies. It is
interesting to note that the Presiding Officer held that the
limitations period does not extend to the RCRA administra-
tive civil penalty actions, while the CJO was not willing to go
that far. Instead, the CJO side-stepped the issue and used the
"relation back" rule contained in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to prevent the limitations period from barring the
civil penalty action.11 9
2. The Toxic Substance Control Act
a. In re Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. (3M Co.)
The limitations period contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2462 has
not been uniformly applied to administrative enforcement ac-
tions for civil penalties under the Toxic Substances Control
Act (TSCA). 20 In 3M Co., ALJ Frazier, III held that the fed-
eral limitations period was not applicable to administrative
assessment of civil penalties under TSCA. 21  The Chief Judi-
issue until it absolutely must be decided.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Administrative decisions have held that 28 U.S.C. § 2462 does not apply to
administrative assessment of TSCA civil penalties. See In re Minnesota Mining &
Manufacturing Co. (3M Co.), No. TSCA-88-H-06, 1989 WL 253236, at *5 (E.P.A.)
(Aug. 7, 1989), afl'd, 1992 WL 92374, at *10 (E.P.A.) (Feb. 28, 1992); In re Tremco,
Inc., No. TSCA-88-H-05, 1989 TSCA LEXIS 13, at *12 (E.P.A.) (Apr. 7, 1989); In re
Bethlehem Steel Corp., No. TSCA-III-322, 1992 WL 118796, at *1 (E.P.A.) (May 12,
1992); In re CWM Chemical Services, No. II TSCA-PCB-91-0213, 1992 WL 90321, at
*1 (E.P.A.) (Mar. 23, 1992).
Some administrative decisions have held that 28 U.S.C. § 2462 does apply to the
administrative assessment of TSCA civil penalties. See In re Dist. of Columbia (Lor-
ton Prison Facility), No. TSCA-III-439, 1991 WL 209857, at * 10 (E.P.A.) (Aug. 30,
1991); In re Commonwealth Edison Co., No. TSCA-V-C-133, 1983 TSCA LEXIS 14,
at *6 (E.P.A.) (Sept. 19, 1983). These decisions, however, may have been superseded
by the Chief Judicial Officer's opinion in In re 3M Co., No. TSCA-88-H-06, 1992 WL
92374, at *10 (E.P.A.) (Feb. 28, 1992), and the EPA's Environmental Appeals Board's
decision in In re CWM Chemical Services, No. II TSCA-PCB-91-0213, 1992 WL
90321, at *1 (E.P.A.) (Mar. 23, 1992). Currently these decisions are on appeal to the
D.C. Circuit. See infra notes 163, 165 and accompanying text.
121. In re 3M Co., No. TSCA-88-H-06, 1989 WL 253236, at *5 (E.P.A.) (Aug. 7,
1989), aff'd, 1992 WL 92374, at *10 (E.P.A.) (Feb. 28, 1992).
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cial Officer affirmed ALJ Frazier's holding.12 The ALJ's deci-
sion held that the language, "an action ... or proceeding for
the enforcement of any civil . .. penalty," contained in 28
U.S.C. § 2462 was applicable only after the penalty had been
assessed by the administrative law court.""3 In other words,
the only purpose of the limitations period was to force the
EPA to collect the assessed penalty within five years of its
assessment or its collection would be barred.
ALJ Frazier's decision distinguished between "enforce-
ment" of a civil penalty and an "assessment" of a civil pen-
alty. 2' The 3M Co. decision was based on the District Court
of New Jersey's holding in United States v. Noble Oil Co.,
Inc. (N.O.C.)." 8 This is the only federal court decision regard-
ing the applicability of the limitations period to TSCA civil
penalties.' 2 6 In N.O.C., the court held that 28 U.S.C. § 2462
did apply to an enforcement action for the previously assessed
civil penalty under section 16(a)(4) of TSCA.1 7 The limita-
tions period, however, did not bar the EPA's action because it
had been filed within five years of the agency's assessment of
the civil penalty. 12 8 The court did state that "section 2462
must be applied separately to both the assessment and the
enforcement of TOSCA penalties.'' 9
In the N.O.C. case, the defendant's TSCA violations oc-
curred, and the EPA became aware of the violations, in
1980.180 The EPA brought an administrative penalty action in
1981 and an administrative civil penalty was assessed in
122. See In re 3M Co., No. TSCA-88-H-06, 1992 WL 92374, at *10 (E.P.A) (Feb.
28, 1992).
123. In re 3M Co., No. TSCA-88-H-06, 1989 WL 253236, at *5 (E.P.A) (Aug. 7,
1989), afl'd, 1992 WL 92374, at *10 (E.P.A.) (Feb. 28, 1992).
124. Id.
125. 28 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1460 (D.N.J. Oct. 14, 1988).
126. Id. The issue came close to being resolved by the D.C. Circuit in Rollins
Envtl. Serv., Inc. v. EPA, 937 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Rollins argued that the com-
plaint was barred by the statute of limitations, but because Rollins failed to file an
administrative appeal of the ALJ's finding that the limitations period does not apply,
the court refused to consider the argument. Rollins, 937 F.2d at 652, n.1.
127. N.O.C., 28 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1467-68.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1461.
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1982.131 The defendant appealed and finally exhausted its ap-
peals on June 26, 1986.3"2 The EPA commenced a proceeding
to collect the administratively assessed civil penalty on Au-
gust 31, 1987."'1 The defendant claimed that the limitations
period began to run on the date that the violations occurred
and, therefore, the EPA's action was time barred by 28 U.S.C.
§ 2462.134 The EPA claimed that the limitations period only
applied after the penalty was assessed at the administrative
level.13 5
The only issue that the court was required to decide in
N.O.C. was whether the EPA's judicial enforcement action
was time barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2462. The court was not re-
quired to decide whether the limitations period applied to the
EPA's administrative penalty assessment proceedings. There-
fore, the court's only holdings were: (1) 28 U.S.C. § 2462 ap-
plied to judicial enforcement of an administratively assessed
penalty; (2) since the agency's assessment of the civil penalty
became final on June 26, 1986, and the enforcement action
was filed on August 31, 1987, the action was timely, and not
barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2462.186 The court's opinion that 28
U.S.C. § 2462 also applied to the administrative assessment
phase has been considered dicta.1 37
Both decisions, 3M Co. and N.O.C., relied on the reason-
ing of the First Circuit in United States v. Meyer.135 In the
131. Id.
132. Id. The defendant appealed to the United States Supreme Court and was
denied certiorari on June 24, 1986. Id. The Third Circuit reissued its affirming judg-
ment order on June 26, 1986, thereby exhausting defendant's appeals. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1464.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. In re 3M Co., TSCA-88-H-06, 1989 WL 253236, at *13 (E.P.A.) (Aug. 7,
1989), aff'd, 1992 WL 92374, at *10; In re Tremco, Inc., No. TSCA-88-H-05, 1989
TSCA LEXIS 13, at *10 (E.P.A.) (Apr. 7, 1989).
138. United States v. Meyer, 808 F.2d 912, 914 (1st Cir. 1987). Where adminis-
trative assessment of a civil penalty is brought within the five-year limitations period
and the penalty assessed at the administrative level is final agency action, 28 U.S.C. §
2462 affords the agency five additional years to commence an action in federal court
to collect the assessed penalty. Id. at 914.
This reasoning may also be flawed because the parties had stipulated that 28
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Meyer case, the defendant had violated the Export Adminis-
tration Act's anti-boycott regulations.139 The Department of
Commerce brought an administrative penalty action against
the defendant and the ALJ imposed a $5,000 civil penalty.14
When the defendant refused to pay the fine the Government
brought an enforcement action in the District Court of Massa-
chusetts to recover the penalty.1 41 The district court held that
the action was time barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2462 because the
limitations period began to run on the date that the violations
had occurred.1 42 The First Circuit reversed this holding and
held that the limitations period commenced after the adminis-
trative assessment of the civil penalty became final. 143
b. In re Tremco, Inc.
In another TSCA administrative hearing, In re Tremco,
Inc., a similar result occurred.1 44 ALJ Vanderheyden held that
the EPA's assessment of civil penalties for violations of TSCA
is a two-stage process. 45 The first stage is the administrative
assessment of the civil penalty. '4 The second stage is the ju-
dicial enforcement of the administratively assessed civil pen-
alty. 47 The ALJ based this distinction on the differences be-
tween the federal district court's enforcement powers and
those of the agency. 4  A district court's powers are "self-exe-
cuting" and enforced by the federal marshall's office. 149 Ad-
U.S.C. § 2462 would have applied to the administrative assessment of a civil penalty.
Id. Since the administrative penalty assessment proceeding was brought within the
five-year limitations period this was not an issue the court needed to decide. Id. The
court's opinion that the limitations period applied to the administrative assessment
proceeding was, therefore, dicta.
139. Id. at 913.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 914.
144. In re Tremco, Inc., No. TSCA-88-H-05, 1989 TSCA LEXIS 13, at *12
(E.P.A.) (Apr. 7, 1989).
145. Id. at *5.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
1992]
27
302 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10
ministrative decisions, however, are merely determinations
that violations have occurred and require that the successful
party go to the district court to obtain payment of the as-
sessed civil penalty.15
In In re Tremco, Inc.,51 ALJ Vanderheyden also criti-
cized the United States v. Noble Oil Co. (N.O.C.) s2 opinion
and held that this case was not dispositive of the TSCA limi-
tations period question. 5 3 In N.O.C., the court stated in its
opinion that the limitations period contained in 28 U.S.C. §
2462 applied to the administrative assessment of TSCA civil
penalties.15 4 The ALJ criticized the N.O.C. opinion because it
was not the court's holding, but was only dicta, since the court
lacked jurisdiction to decide this issue."" Regardless, the ALJ
held that the limitations period does not apply to administra-
tive assessment of civil penalties for TSCA violations. 56
ALJ Vanderheyden distinguished TSCA from RCRA and
suggested the result would be different had the case been for
enforcement of a RCRA civil penalty.15 7 The main difference
between RCRA and TSCA enforcement actions for civil pen-
alties is that only RCRA enforcement actions may be brought
by the EPA either administratively or judicially.15 8 Under
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. 28 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1460 (D.N.J. Oct. 14, 1988).
153. In re Tremco, Inc., No. TSCA-88-H-05, 1989 TSCA LEXIS 13, at *10
(E.P.A.) (Apr. 7, 1989).
154. 28 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1460 (D.N.J. Oct. 14, 1988).
155. In re Tremco, Inc., No. TSCA-88-H-05, 1989 TSCA LEXIS 13, at *10. The
N.O.C. decision even stated that the court did not have jurisdiction to determine if 28
U.S.C. § 2462 applied to the administrative enforcement of the TSCA civil penalty,
especially since the defendant did not assert any time bar to the EPA's assessment
proceeding. N.O.C., 28 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1468 n.11.
156. In re Tremco, Inc., No. TSCA-88-H-05, 1989 TSCA LEXIS 13, at *12
(E.P.A.) (Apr. 7, 1989).
157. Id. at *13.
158. Section 3008 of RCRA states:
[W]henever on the basis of any information the Administrator determines
that any person violated or is in violation of any requirement of this sub-
chapter, the Administrator may issue an order assessing a civil penalty for
any past or current violation, requiring compliance immediately or within a
specified time period, or both, or the Administrator may commence a civil
action in the United States district court in the district in which the violation
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol10/iss1/9
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RCRA, enforcement of civil penalties can take place at either
the administrative level' 59 or in the district court in which the
violation occurred.16 0 Enforcement actions under TSCA must
begin at the administrative level with the assessment of the
civil penalty, thereafter proceeding to the district court for
enforcement. 1 ' ALJ Vanderheyden sought to distinguish
RCRA because, in another administrative decision he decided,
In re Waterville Industries, the ALJ held that the statute of
limitations contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2462 applied to the EPA's
administrative assessment proceedings for civil penalties
under section 3008 of RCRA. 62
The distinction between TSCA and RCRA appears to be
flawed. Neither statute contains a limitations period. The dis-
tinction drawn by ALJ Vanderheyden between mandatory ad-
ministrative proceedings and optional judicial proceedings
seems illogical. A company may be held liable for civil penal-
ties under TSCA for violations occurring more than five years
earlier, merely because the statute mandates that the action
start at the administrative level, while RCRA actions for civil
penalties, which may start in either forum, will be subject to
the limitations provision contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2462.
The distinction between administrative assessment and
judicial enforcement is also weak. Penalties under RCRA may
be assessed administratively, yet may be subject to the statute
of limitations under the Coors and Waterville decisions. 63 In
either forum, if the violator refuses to pay a previously as-
sessed civil penalty, the government will have to go to the dis-
occurred for appropriate relief, including a temporary or permanent
injunction.
RCRA § 3008(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(1) (1988) (emphasis added).
159. See 40 C.F.R. § 22.01(4) (1992); see also RIDGEWAY M. HALL, JR. ET AL.,
RCRA HAZARDOUS WASTES HANDBOOK, 10-8 (7th ed. 1987).
160. RCRA § 3008(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a) (1988).
161. "A civil penalty for a violation of section 2614 of this title shall be assessed
by the Administrator by an order made of the record after opportunity . . . for a
hearing in accordance with section 554 of [this title] .... Toxic Substance Control
Act (TSCA) § 16(a)(2)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2)(A) (1988).
162. In re Waterville Indus., No. RCRA-I-87-1086, 1988 RCRA LEXIS 20, at *9-
10 (June 23, 1988).
163. Id.; see also supra subpart IV.B.1.
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trict court to enforce the penalty judgment. It may be easier
to enforce the judicial penalty assessment but the distinction
between the two forums is too weak to warrant different treat-
ment for limitations purposes. The statute of limitations
should be applied or not applied uniformly to administrative
and judicial proceedings, since the goals and policies underly-
ing the limitations period should remain the same at both
levels.
c. The Future of TSCA Administrative Civil Penal-
ties
The EPA's Environmental Appeals Board has issued two
administrative decisions on the applicability of the limitations
period to TSCA civil penalties since the CJO affirmed ALJ
Frazier's holding in 3M Co. that no limitations period applied
to the administrative assessment of TSCA civil penalties in
3M Co.'" Both of these decisions reversed earlier holdings
that the limitations period applied to both the administrative
assessment of TSCA civil penalty and the enforcement of
TSCA civil penalties in federal court. These decisions fol-
lowed the holding enunciated in the 3M Co. administrative
decision.""e
On March 27, 1992, 3M Company petitioned the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia (D.C. Circuit) for judicial
review of the administrative determination that no limitations
period applies to TSCA civil penalties."'6 CWM Chemical Ser-
vices and its parent companies, Chemical Waste Management,
Inc., and Waste Management, Inc., have similarly asked the
164. See In re Bethlehem Steel Corp., No. TSCA-III-322, 1992 WL 118796, at *1
(E.P.A.) (May 12, 1992) (in light of the In re 3M Co. decision, this appeal reversed
the ALJ's holding that the five-year limitations period contained in 28 U.S.C § 2462
applied to administrative assessment of civil penalties under TSCA); In re CWM
Chem. Serv., Inc., No. TSCA-PCB-91-0213, 1992 WL 90321, at *1 (E.P.A.) (Mar. 23,
1992) (same); see also Chem. Reg. Daily (BNA) (Feb. 14, 1992) (discussion of original
AU decision applying 28 U.S.C. § 2462 to TSCA enforcement actions).
165. See supra note 164; see also infra note 166.
166. Envtl. L. Update (BNA) (June 24, 1992); see also 16 Chem. Reg. Rep.
(BNA) 653 (current report) (June 26, 1992); Chem. Reg. Daily (BNA) (June 24, 1992).
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D.C. Circuit to review the administrative ruling. 167 CWM re-
quested that the D.C. Circuit combine its petition with the
court's review of the 3M Co. appeal. 168 The EPA filed a mo-
tion to dismiss these two appeals and opposed CWM's request
to combine the two decisions.16 9
The limitations question should be decided under TSCA
before it is under RCRA. To date, the D.C. Circuit had not
issued an opinion in the 3M Co. or CWM appeal. If the D.C.
Circuit issues a decision, its decision could have an impact on
another court's decision regarding the limitations period and
RCRA civil penalties.
C. Courts May Apply the Limitations Period to RCRA Civil
Penalties
Should the courts hold that a limitations period applies
to the enforcement of civil penalties under RCRA, courts
must determine whether a state or federal limitations period
is appropriate. Traditionally, when a federal statute does not
contain a limitations period within its language, a state stat-
ute of limitations applies.17 0 An exception to this general rule
is made when national interests are at stake and application
of a state limitations period would cause a lack of uniformity
in the federal statute's enforcement, frustrate the federal stat-
ute's goals or interfere with the implementation of national
policy. When such an exception is made, courts should adopt
a limitations period from applicable federal law. 17 1 For exam-
ple, federal courts have refused to apply a state statute of lim-
167. See supra notes 164, 166. These parties face the potential liability of several
million dollars. "In March of 1991, EPA charged CWM Chemical Services and other
waste management firms and the General Motors Corp. with improper disposal of
PCB-contaminated sludge. The combined proposed fine was $35.4 million." Envtl. L.
Update (BNA) (June 24, 1992).
168. See supra notes 164, 166.
169. See supra notes 164, 166.
170. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975); see also
supra part III.B.1.
171. Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Ter-
minals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 74 (3d Cir. 1990); Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 608 F. Supp. 440, 447-48 (D. Md. 1985); Connecticut Fund For the Env't
v. Job Plating Co., 623 F. Supp. 207, 212 (D. Conn. 1985).
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itations under the Clean Water Act because the application of
a state limitations period was found to frustrate the uniform
enforcement of the Clean Water Act.172
RCRA, like the Clean Water Act, is a federal statute with
national environmental policy concerns. RCRA is concerned
with the national waste disposal problem facing our country
today. If a limitations period applies to RCRA actions for civil
penalties, the federal statute of limitations should apply. A
state statute of limitations would frustrate RCRA's goals by
causing non-uniform enforcement. Without uniformity in
RCRA enforcement actions, some states may become pollu-
tion havens by virtue of having shorter limitations periods.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Powell
Duffryn Terminals, Inc.,' 73 rejected the plaintiff's argument
that since the states may enact stricter standards under the
Clean Water Act than those set at the federal level and New
Jersey did not have a limitations period for civil penalties,
"the more stringent state procedural rule[s] should prevail."''
The federal courts will probably hold that the general
federal five-year statute of limitations for civil penalties ap-
plies to RCRA civil penalty enforcement actions. The courts
will likely reason that because the general federal five-year
statute of limitations 5 has been applied to other environ-
mental statutes that similarly lack a limitations period, it
should also apply to RCRA civil penalties. 1 6 However, the
fundamental differences between RCRA and the other envi-
ronmental statutes to which the courts have applied 28 U.S.C
§ 2462, in particular the Clean Water Act, may persuade the
courts to hold that this limitations period should not apply to
RCRA enforcement actions. Because RCRA regulates waste
from the point it is generated, through its storage and dispo-
172. Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Ter-
minals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1990). See also Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., 834
F.2d 1517 (9th Cir. 1987).
173. Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Ter-
minals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1990).
174. Id. at 73-74.
175. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1988).
176. See supra notes 75-84.
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sal, and continues to monitor the disposal for up to thirty
years, 17 a five-year limitations period is far too brief to ade-
quately protect the environment from hazardous waste viola-
tions. The five-year limitations period may frustrate the in-
tent of Congress to ensure the safe management, recycling,
minimization, and disposal of hazardous wastes."M Limiting
RCRA enforcement actions to five-years would unduly restrict
the EPA's and the public's ability to adequately enforce
RCRA and would run counter to the Congress's long-term reg-
ulatory intent.
However, a judicial finding that the limitations period ap-
plies to civil penalties under RCRA, does not end the inquiry.
Plaintiffs may still argue that the running of the limitations
period was tolled. A plaintiff, either the EPA or a citizens
group, must determine when its cause of action has accrued
and what events, if any, may have tolled1 79 the running of the
statute of limitations. Tolling addresses when the limitations
period begins to run and what circumstances suspend the run-
ning of the statute of limitations. 80 Tolling theories that may
suspend the running of a limitations period include fraudulent
concealment, the discovery rule, and the continuous violations
theory which will be discussed in detail in Part V below.
V. Exemptions and Tolling Theories Regarding Statutes of
Limitations
A. The Continuous Violations Theory: An Exemption to the
Statute of Limitations
When there is a continuous duty to perform an act, the
limitations period does not apply when some portion of the
177. See 40 C.F.R. § 264.117(a)(1) (1992).
178. RCRA § 1003(a)(4)-(6), 42 U.S.C § 6902(a)(4)-(6) (1988).
179. The term "toll" is defined as: "[tjo bar, defeat, or take away; thus, to toll
the entry means to deny or take away the right of entry. To suspend or stop tempora-
rily as the statute of limitations is tolled during the defendant's absence from the
jurisdiction and during the plaintiff's minority." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1488 (6th
ed. 1990). "To 'toll' a statute of limitations means to show facts which remove its bar
of the action." 54 C.J.S. Limitation of Actions § 85 (1987).
180. Bomba v. W.L. Belvidere, Inc., 579 F.2d 1067, 1070 (7th Cir. 1978).
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offense occurs within the limitations period. The continuous
violations theory to the statute of limitations rests on the pre-
mise that the statute of limitations runs from each of a series
of wrongful acts during the course of a continuing violation.181
Under this theory, a cause of action accrues only after the oc-
currence of the last significant event necessary for the claim to
be viable occurs. 181 Each time a plaintiff is injured by a de-
fendant's act, a cause of action accrues, and the statute of lim-
itations begins to run on that act.183 Therefore, a plaintiff may
only collect damages occurring within the limitations
period.184
For example, assuming a five-year limitations period ap-
plies, if a continuous illegal act began seven years ago and the
plaintiff filed the complaint for civil penalties today, the most
the plaintiff could recover in the action is five years' worth of
civil penalties. The defendant could raise the limitations de-
fense to the first two years of violations.
In United States v. SCM Corp., the district court of Ma-
ryland applied 28 U.S.C. § 2462 to an EPA action brought in
1985 against the corporation. The government's action for
civil penalties resulted from violations of the Clean Air Act
which occurred between August 7, 1977 and January 2, 1985.
The United States filed its complaint in January 1985.185 The
court held that the EPA was still entitled to recover civil pen-
alties for violations occurring from January 3, 1980, until the
time it filed its complaint in January 1985.186 Although the
violations were continuous, occurring from 1977 until suit was
brought in 1985, the district court only allowed recovery of
the civil penalties for violations which occurred within the
five-year time period of 28 U.S.C. § 2462 and barred recovery
181. See Ames v. Texaco, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1317 (W.D. Mich. 1983); see also In
re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 591 F.2d 68, 71 (9th Cir. 1979).
182. Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Bendix-Westinghouse Auto. Air Brake Co., 372 F.2d
18, 20 (3d Cir. 1966) (citing Foley v. Pittsburgh Des Moines Co., 68 A.2d 517 (Pa.
1949)).
183. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 338 (1971).
184. See United States v. SCM Corp., 667 F. Supp. 1110, 1123 (D. Md. 1987).
185. Id.
186. Id.
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of civil penalties for the time period between August 7, 1977
and January 1, 1980.18'
However, in a recent criminal case a district court sug-
gested that when a continuous offense occurs, a limitations
period may not limit the government's prosecution of that of-
fense as long as a portion of the offense falls within the limita-
tions period. 18 In United States v. White,"a" the United
States indicted the defendants for illegally storing, treating,
and disposing of a hazardous waste without a permit. The de-
fendants had stored rinseates from pesticide tanks in a large
evaporation tank from 1982 to 1987 without a RCRA per-
mit. ' ° In 1987, the defendants applied these rinseates to land
without a hazardous waste disposal permit.19' The govern-
ment indicted the defendants in 1990, nearly eight years after
the alleged illegal activity had begun.9 2 The defendants filed
a motion to dismiss in which they raised a statute of limita-
tions defense. 93 The defendants argued that even if this ac-
tivity was a continuous offense, which they did not concede,
they could not be prosecuted for the portions of the offense
that occurred more than five years before the filing of the in-
dictment. 4 The court disagreed and concluded that the de-
fendants' actions were continuous offenses. 95 The court fur-
ther held that RCRA made one act criminal and provided for
increased penalties based upon the length of the illegal activ-
ity. ' The court dismissed the defendants' motion to dismiss
187. Id.
188. United States v. White, 766 F. Supp. 873, 886-87 (E.D. Wash. 1991).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 877.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 886.
193. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1988). The limitations provision states: "Ex-
cept as otherwise expressly provided by law, no person shall be prosecuted, tried, or
punished for any offense, not capital, unless the indictment is found or the informa-
tion is instituted within five years next after such offense shall have been commit-
ted." Id.
194. United States v. White, 766 F. Supp. at 887.
195. Id.
196. Id. This holding is puzzling because if RCRA "makes one act criminal," the
question is what was that one act. If it was the original illegal storage beginning in
1982, then the five-year limitations statute should have barred the government's en-
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and its statute of limitations claim. 197
This decision is interesting in that it suggests that the
government may actually be able to recover criminal fines for
almost eight years of violations even though a federal statute
of limitations exists that could potentially limit the govern-
ment's case to five years.198 On the other hand, this court did
not consider the issue of criminal fines and, even though the
limitations period contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3282 did not bar
prosecution, the limitations period contained in 28 U.S.C. §
2462 may still bar the enforcement of more than five years of
civil fines under RCRA.19 9
The United States v. White case may be distinguishable
from a civil penalty action because White only involved a mo-
tion to dismiss a criminal prosecution using the statute of lim-
itations. However, when a crime is a continuous one, and Con-
gress intended to treat the crime as continuous, the statute of
limitations will "not begin to run until the continuous com-
mitment of the crime ceases."200 A court should also apply
this reasoning to RCRA violations that are continuous in na-
ture. The government, a state, or a citizen group can then use
this theory to recover more than five years worth of civil pen-
alty for continuous RCRA violations.
Allowing recovery of more than five years worth of civil
penalties will solve many of the problems associated with ap-
plying a five-year limitations period. However, it is unclear
tire prosecution for the offense.
197. Id.
198. See 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1988). This case, however, did not interpret the limi-
tations period contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2462, nor did it consider the issue of criminal
fines or civil penalties. The court was only determining if 18 U.S.C. § 3282, the five-
year statute of limitations for criminal offenses, barred the government's prosecution
of the defendants. The court did suggest, however, that the government may be enti-
tled to pursue violations nearly eight years old.
199. This should have been an important consideration of the court's decision
because criminal fines are the primary enforcement tool used in environmental
prosecutions.
200. 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 200 (1989); see also United States v. Eklund, 551
F. Supp. 964, 969 (S.D. Iowa 1982) (when dealing with a continuous offense, the limi-
tations period will not begin to run until the offense ceases); Toussie v. United States,
397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970) (the Congress must have clearly intended to treat the offense
as a continuous offense to bar the running of the limitations period).
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whether a court will decide the issue in this manner. As dis-
cussed above, the United State v. SCM Corp. decision sug-
gests that a court may limit the action to five-years. The SCM
decision, however, involved air violations resulting from sepa-
rate and discrete stack violations. In White the continuous il-
legal storage was a single prolonged act. This distinction be-
tween the two cases may also explain their different
interpretations of the limitations periods. These distinctions
may also persuade a court to allow the EPA to recover more
than five years worth of civil penalties for hazardous waste
storage and disposal violations.
Another potential problem with using the statute of limi-
tations and the continuous violations theory is that a poten-
tial RCRA violator will not report its RCRA violations. It is
likely that the RCRA violator would have illegally bypassed
the hazardous waste manifest provisions and the resulting en-
vironmental damage is unlikely to be discovered until long af-
ter the five-year limitations period expires. A further problem
arises if a court should hold that this illegal activity consti-
tutes an illegal disposal of hazardous waste. Should a court
hold that the act was an illegal disposal of hazardous waste it
could also hold that this is a completed act and, therefore, no
continuous violation exists. 01
The question then becomes: "when did the limitations
period begin to run?". Under the United States v. SCM anal-
ysis, the continuous violations theory does not toll the run-
ning of the limitations period, but only starts a new limita-
tions period for each new offense. 02 Plaintiffs alleging a
continuous violation would then only be able to recover a
maximum of five years worth of civil penalties. Possible as-
sessment of civil penalties for only a five-year period may not
be much of a deterrent since possible violators may take the
chance that their violation will go undetected during the five-
year time period and the limitations period in 28 U.S.C. §
2462 would then relieve them of liability for civil penalties.
This could occur if a court finds that the disposal was a com-
201. But see infra part V.B. (discovery rule section).
202. United States v. SCM Corp., 667 F. Supp. at 1123.
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pleted act, and not a continuous violation, and that the limi-
tations period began to run when the violation occurred.2 03
This would be a substantial risk for a violator to take be-
cause the daily civil penalty for a RCRA violation is $25,000
per day, per violation.2 04 However, RCRA's main deterrent
provision against violations, civil penalties, may not work if
the limitations period limits or bars nearly all civil penalty
actions where the government fails to bring its action within
five years of the violation. Considering the high costs of haz-
ardous waste disposal, this may create an incentive to violate
the act and generators, transporters, or TSD facilities may
gamble that the government will not bring its action within
the five-year limitations period.
1. The Storage versus Disposal Distinction and the Con-
tinuous Violations Theory
One court that has recognized this problem created a
unique solution. In DeHart v. State, 05 the court found the
defendant could be liable for civil and criminal penalties for
hazardous wastes placed in and on the ground in 1977 before
the 1980 RCRA storage permit requirements became effec-
tive.206 Hazardous waste listings are retroactive, and once the
EPA determines the waste to be hazardous by regulation, its
determination applies regardless of when the waste was dis-
posed.07 Thus, even if wastes are not classified as hazardous
203. But see infra part IV.B. (discovery rule section). This, however, may not
occur because the discovery rule may toll the running of the statute of limitations.
Also, under the Clean Water Act, the limitations period does not begin to run until
the discharger files its Discharge Monitoring Reports. If we apply this reasoning to
RCRA, the limitations period should not begin to run until the generator, trans-
porter, and TSD facility completes the manifest requirements. Similar to a DMR, the
manifest would give the public adequate notice and opportunity to discover a viola-
tion so they can bring a citizen suit against the violator.
204. "Any person who violates any-requirement of this subchapter shall be liable
to the United States for a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed $25,000 for each
such violation. Each day of such violation shall, for purposes of this subsection, con-
stitute a separate violation." RCRA § 3008, 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (1988).
205. DeHart v. State, 471 N.E.2d 312 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984), reh'g denied Jan. 15,
1985.
206. Id. at 314.
207..United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 733 F. Supp. 1215, 1223 (N.D.
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when placed into a storage unit, all such wastes meeting the
hazardous waste description will be deemed hazardous no
matter when they were disposed. 2°8
Similarly, placing waste in storage without a permit,
before the permit requirements became effective, does not
constitute a violation. Once the permit requirements become
effective, stored hazardous waste is subject to those require-
ments. Failure to obtain a permit becomes a violation as of
the date the regulations come into effect. Each day a permit is
not obtained is a separate violation of RCRA.
In DeHart, the defendant was found liable even though
the hazardous waste was placed in and above the ground in
1977, before the hazardous waste storage regulations were
promulgated. The court found that placing hazardous waste in
and above the ground did not constitute disposal20 9 of waste
but constituted storage2 10 of hazardous waste without a per-
mit, which violated RCRA storage regulations.2"
This is a major legal distinction since what traditionally
could have been viewed as disposal before the enactment of
Ind. 1989). Most of RCRA only contemplates prospective application, but "current or
continuing violations may be addressed despite the fact that they may have
originated in activities occurring before the effective date of the statute." Id.; see also
United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 739-40
(8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied 484 U.S. 848 (1987); United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp.
1055, 1071 (D.N.J. 1981).
208. Conservation Chem. Co., 733 F. Supp. at 1223.
209. DeHart, 471 N.E.2d at 314. EPA defines "disposal" as:
the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any
solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that such solid
waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter the environ-
ment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any waters, including
ground waters.
40 C.F.R. § 260.10 (1992) (note that this definition is the same definition that is
found in RCRA); see also RCRA § 1004(3), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (1988).
210. EPA defines "storage" as "the holding of hazardous waste for a temporary
period, at the end of which the hazardous waste is treated, disposed of, or stored
elsewhere." 40 C.F.R. § 260.10 (1992).
Congress defined storage to "mean the containment of hazardous waste, either on
a temporary basis or for a period of years, in such a manner as not to constitute
disposal of hazardous waste." RCRA § 1004(33), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(33) (1988).
211. DeHart, 471 N.E.2d at 315; 40 C.F.R. § 262.34(a) (1991) (a generator may
accumulate hazardous waste on site for ninety days or less without a permit, but after
ninety days he must obtain a permit to store the waste).
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RCRA was seen as storage by this court.21 In essence, the
court held that maintaining hazardous waste in a condition
that does not constitute "safe and proper disposal" will be
considered an illegal storage of hazardous waste without a
permit and a continuous violation.
Under the DeHart reading of the statute, all storage by
the defendant after 1980 was a violation of the permit re-
quirements of RCRA. In DeHart, the court found that illegal
storage was a continuous violation, and defendant could be li-
able for civil and criminal penalties from the date the permit
requirements became effective until defendant obtained a per-
mit.213 Since the court construed the defendant's actions as
storage and not disposal, the defendant had a continuous duty
to act by obtaining a storage permit. Thus, the action was
brought within the five-year limitations period.214 The court
did not have to rule that the statute of limitations contained
in 28 U.S.C. § 2462 applied to RCRA actions for civil penal-
ties since the storage regulations were not more than five
years old when the state filed its complaint. A continuous vio-
lation finding would act to lessen the rigid effect a five-year
limitations period could have on enforcement of RCRA civil
penalties.
In Lykins v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., a federal dis-
trict court similarly refused to dismiss a RCRA enforcement
action brought by Kentucky landowners and residents when
defendant's violations were ongoing.216 RCRA requirements
apply to ongoing waste disposal practices regardless of when
212. The brief facts of this case suggest that the court may have accepted the
defendant's argument that the waste was disposed of and abandoned before the
RCRA regulations were issued and, therefore, constituted a completed act of disposal.
Since RCRA does not apply retroactively like CERCLA, this would have dismissed
the RCRA claim. The court, however, seized upon the facts that there were substan-
tial amounts of damaged and deteriorated barrels in the soil and standing around the
site. The court held that the distinction between the definition of "disposal" and
"storage" was intended to prevent "the stockpiling of huge quantities of dangerous
material [and] then abandoning . . ." it. DeHart, 471 N.E.2d at 315.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. 27 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1590, 1597-98 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 29, 1988).
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the disposal began.21
A later case, United States v. Conservation Chemical Co.
of Illinois,1 7 also followed the DeHart reasoning and held
that "the fact that no material was placed in certain basins
after the effective date of the [storage] regulations [did] not,
in itself, absolve defendant of liability . . ." for the hazardous
waste still contained in the basin after the regulations became
effective.216 The determination of whether the waste had been
disposed of or was being stored was not an issue in the pro-
ceeding, yet the court felt it was important enough to discuss
"because the issue will ultimately need to be resolved . "...,1219
Thus, this court has indicated that the fact that no hazardous
waste was placed in the land disposal units since the permit
regulations became effective and the fact that the site was also
an inactive hazardous waste site, was not dispositive of the
storage versus disposal issue. Abandonment or inactivity will
not automatically constitute a "disposal" of hazardous waste,
but may constitute an illegal "storage" of hazardous waste.22
It remains to be seen how far other federal courts will go
with the distinction between "disposal" and "storage." If
other courts follow the same line of reasoning, an owner or
operator of a hazardous waste TSD facility that accepted haz-
ardous waste and "stored" it at the facility before the 1980
permit requirements could be subjected to a civil penalty en-
forcement action for his illegal "storage" without a permit af-
ter 1980. This would constitute a continuous violation subject-
ing the defendant to liability for at least five years of civil
penalties under the reasoning of DeHart, Conservation Chem-
ical Co., and the continuous duty to act theory.221
Under the continuous violation theory, coupled with the
storage versus disposal distinction, a disposal facility may be
found liable for the illegal storage of waste even when the
waste was allegedly disposed of prior to the promulgation of
216. Id. at 1597.
217. 733 F. Supp. 1215 (N.D. Ind. 1989).
218. Id. at 1223.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. DeHart, 471 N.E.2d 315.
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the RCRA hazardous waste storage and disposal regulations.
Although waste was not considered hazardous waste at the
time it was allegedly disposed, it may later be deemed a "stor-
age" of waste without a permit.222 Under this scenario, the
owner or operator of the "storage" facility would then be sub-
ject to potential liability for civil penalties for a continuous
violation of the storage permit requirements of RCRA.2
2. A Continuous Unlawful Act versus Continuous Ill-
Effects
If a court finds that the activity in DeHart and Conserva-
tion Chemical Co. was a disposal that had ended, the statute
of limitations, if applicable, might bar the EPA's, a state's or
a citizen's enforcement suit for civil penalties."" It is likely
that the disposal will be considered a single violation produc-
ing continued ill effects rather than a continuous violation of
the RCRA requirements 25 However, a defendant may still be
subject to liability if the hazardous waste begins to leak. Any
leakage from a container is defined as a disposal. Therefore, as
each container of hazardous waste begins to leak, a new viola-
tion occurs.
A continuous unlawful act resulting from a continuing vi-
olation, not the continued ill-effects from the original viola-
tion,226 tolls the running of a statute of limitations under a
222. See DeHart, 471 N.E.2d at 314.
223. See id. at 312; Conservation Chem. Co., 733 F. Supp. 1215.
224. In DeHart this might have been the case because the suit was commenced
more than five years after the hazardous waste had been placed into the ground. De-
Hart, 471 N.E.2d at 313.
225. See Ward v. Caulk, 650 F.2d 1114 (9th Cir. 1975). The disposal would be
seen as a continued ill effect of the original illegal act of disposal on which the limita-
tions period may have run. If the violation was storage without a permit, then each
day of operation without a permit is, in and of itself, a separate and new violation, or
a continuous violation of the RCRA permit requirements on which a new limitations
period begins.
The DeHart court hinted that had this been disposal, it arguably could have
been seen as a completed act before the hazardous waste regulations were in effect.
DeHart, 471 N.E.2d at 315. The court then would have found differently, since RCRA
is not applied retroactively like CERCLA.
226. Ward v. Caulk, 650 F.2d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 1981); Collins v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 514 F.2d 594, 596 (9th Cir. 1975). In Ward, the court held that the plain-
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continuous violations theory.2 2 This is the main reason why
the court in DeHart found a continuous storage in violation of
RCRA. The continuous unlawful act in DeHart was the stor-
age of hazardous waste without a permit. In short, each day
this unpermitted storage of hazardous waste continued, a new
violation occurred and a new statute of limitations period be-
gan for each of the new violations.
a. The "Leaking" Exception
Improper disposal of hazardous waste has deleterious ef-
fects on the environment including contamination of the air,
the groundwater, and nearby bodies of water. Under a strict
interpretation of the continuous violation theory, these con-
tinuing ill-effects resulting from the improper disposal of haz-
ardous waste would not constitute a continuous unlawful act
under a continuous violation theory. However, in United
States v. Hardage,2 the court held that leaking waste from
the defendant's disposal site constituted a disposal of hazard-
ous waste within the meaning of the statute.2 29 The fact that
tiff's action against his employer for denying his promotion on racial grounds in viola-
tion of the Civil Rights Act was time barred by the statute of limitations because his
continuous unemployment was not a continuous violation of the Act. The court held
that the plaintiff had brought the suit after the limitations period had expired be-
cause the limitations period had begun to run at the time when the plaintiff had been
wrongfully fired. Ward, 650 F.2d at 1147.
227. United States v. Advance Mach. Co., 547 F. Supp. 1085 (D. Minn. 1982). A
defendant's failure to comply with the mandatory hazard reporting requirements of
the Consumer Protection Safety Act was held to be a continuous violation which
barred the running of the statute of limitations. In this case, the court held that the
statute of limitations would not have started running until the report was filed or the
manufacturer acquired knowledge that the Government was adequately informed. Id.
at 1091.
228. United States v. Hardage, 18 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1687 (W.D. Okla. Dec.
13, 1982).
229. Id. at 1695. The statutory definition of "disposal" is:
the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking or placing of any
solid waste or hazardous waste into or onto any land or water so that such
solid waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter the envi-
ronment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any waters, including
ground waters.
RCRA § 1004(3), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (1988) (emphasis added); see also supra note
209 (EPA regulatory definition of "disposal").
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this case involved an interpretation of the statutory definition
and not the regulatory definition of "disposal" should not
make much of a difference, though, since the EPA's regulatory
definition of "disposal" is identical to the statutory defini-
tion.2 3 0 Therefore, leakage of a previously disposed hazardous
waste, in theory, can constitute a second disposal, even though
the material was undisturbed after the initial disposal. Argua-
bly, this second disposal would also be a second violation if
the owner of the site did not have a permit for the initial
disposal.
In United States v. Conservation Chemical Co.,23 1 the
court held that the migration of hazardous wastes from their
initial disposal site was, in and of itself, a disposal of hazard-
ous waste under RCRA. A disposal occurs "not only when
solid waste or hazardous waste is first deposited, dumped,
spilled or placed onto or into the ground or water, but also
when such wastes migrate from their initial location.''121
The holdings in Conservation Chemical Co. 233 and
Hardage2 3 4 can be used to overcome the barrier imposed by
the continuous ill-effects restriction 3 5 to the continuous viola-
tion theory. The Hardage and the Conservation Chemical Co.
decisions were both "imminent and substantial" actions and
not penalty actions. However, it may be argued that since the
regulatory and statutory definition of disposal are identical, a
leaking container is an illegal disposal without a permit. Thus,
an owner or operator of a leaking hazardous waste disposal
site, who prior to the site's leaking was not subjected to civil
penalties by reason of the statute of limitations, may now be
subject to civil penalties of up to $25,000 per day, per viola-
tion, for the illegal "disposal" of hazardous waste if a plaintiff
230. Compare RCRA § 1004(3), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (1988) and 40 C.F.R. §
260.10 (1991); see supra notes 209 (regulatory definition of "disposal") and 229 (stat-
utory definition of "disposal").
231. 619 F. Supp. 162 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
232. Id. at 200.
233. Id.
234. United States v. Hardage, 18 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1687 (W.D. Okla.
1982).
235. Id.
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brings a civil penalty enforcement action for an illegal dispo-
sal of a hazardous waste without a permit.
B. Discovery Rule Applied to Toll the Statute of Limitations
The statute of limitations typically begins to run when
the act which gives rise to the violation occurred.2"  The dis-
covery rule, as applied to fraudulent concealment of wrongdo-
ing, is one exception to the general rule that the limitations
period accrues on the day of the alleged wrong.23 7 Where
plaintiff's ignorance of a cause of action is the result of the
defendant's conduct and not the result of the plaintiff's "neg-
lect or stupidity", the statute of limitations will not run to the
benefit of the wrongdoer.2 3 8 The discovery rule has also been
called the "blameless ignorance doctrine". 3 9 The statute of
limitations begins to run when the plaintiff discovers or
should have discovered, all the facts necessary to determine
that there was an invasion of his rights that would support a
cause of action. 40
Under the Clean Water Act (CWA), 41 the statute of limi-
tations for civil penalties2 42 begins to run when the manufac-
turer files its Discharge Monitoring Reports (DMRs)24 s with
the EPA and not when the permit violation occurs.4 In Si-
236. United States v. Core Lab., 759 F.2d 480, 482 (5th Cir. 1985).
237. 51 Am. JuR. 2D Limitations of Actions § 146 (1970).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. 51 Am. JUR. 2D Limitations of Actions § 146 (1970 & Supp. 1992). Generally
a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known that a viola-
tion of his rights has occurred. DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 588 F.
Supp. 902, 908 (D. Md. 1984); Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1340 (9th Cir.
1985).
241. CWA §§ 101-607, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988).
242. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1988).
243. CWA § 308, 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a) (1988). Under the Clean Water Act, a dis-
charger of any pollutant from a point source into a navigable water of the United
States is required to file DMRs which state whether the discharger has complied with
his permit conditions under the Act. A violation of the permit is to be reported imme-
diately to the EPA. Id.; see also 40 C.F.R. § 122.41() (1992).
244. Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp., 635 F. Supp.
284, 288 (N.D.N.Y. 1986); Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Pow-
ell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 75 (3d Cir. 1990). See, e.g., United States v.
1992]
45
320 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
erra Club v. Union Oil Co.,24 5 for example, the court found
that the action brought under the CWA2"4 was time-barred by
the statute of limitations because the Sierra Club knew or
should have known of the violations resulting in the cause of
action prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations.2 7
1. Fraudulent Concealment
The trend of decisions support the general rule:
that [when] a party against whom a cause of action
has accrued in favor of another prevents such other, by
actual fraudulent concealment, from obtaining knowledge
thereof, or the fraud is of such a character as to conceal
itself, the statute of limitations will begin to run from the
time the right of action is discovered or by the exercise of
ordinary diligence might have been discovered.'"
Furthermore, "[e]quity reads the doctrine of fraudulent con-
cealment into every statute of limitations. 2 4 9
The plaintiff must meet three prerequisites for pleading a
claim of fraudulent concealment: "(1) wrongful concealment
of their actions by the defendants, (2) failure of the plaintiff
to discover the operative facts that are the basis of his cause
of action within the limitations period; and (3) plaintiff's [ex-
ercise of] due diligence until discovery of the facts."25
Fraudulent concealment does not necessarily result from
a defendant's silence on a cause of action brought against him,
particularly when the defendant owes no legal duty to the
Advanced Mach. Co., 547 F. Supp. 1085, 1091 (D. Minn. 1982) (under the Consumer
Product Safety Act, the statute of limitations was tolled when the defendant failed to
make a timely report of his violation as required by the Act).
245. 813 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1987).
246. CWA §§ 101-607, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988).
247. Sierra Club, 813 F.2d at 1493.
248. 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitations of Actions § 147 (1970).
249. United States v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 518 F. Supp. 1021, 1036
(N.D. Ohio 1981) (citing Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396-97 (1946)).
250. Dayco Corp. v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 523 F.2d 389, 394 (6th Cir.
1975) (citing Weinberger v. Retail Credit Co., 498 F.2d 552 (4th Cir. 1974); see also 51
AM. JUR. 2D Limitations of Actions § 148 (1970).
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plaintiff. " ' "Passive silence ... is insufficient to trigger the
fraudulent concealment doctrine absent allegations that the
defendant was in a continuing fiduciary relationship with the
plaintiff. 2 52
However, mere failure to reveal may be considered fraud-
ulent concealment when a failure to reveal will result in an
undue hardship or a wrong. 53 Most of the environmental stat-
utes include a mandatory duty to report violations of the stat-
ute, so fraudulent concealment can be applicable to such stat-
utes when a defendant has failed to report his violation.
Therefore, since "equity reads the doctrine of fraudulent con-
cealment into every statute of limitations," 4 the doctrine of
fraudulent concealment may eventually be applied to all stat-
utory environmental actions.
VI. Injunctive Remedies Under RCRA: Will A Limitations
Period Apply?
A. The General Federal Five-Year Statute of Limitations
Will Not Apply to Injunctive Relief under RCRA
A statute of limitations will not apply to RCRA injunc-
tive actions.2" The limitations period contained in 28 U.S.C. §
2462 should not apply to RCRA's corrective action orders256 or
to RCRA's abatement orders .25 This should hold true regard-
less of whether the courts eventually find that the 28 U.S.C. §
2462 limitations period applies to the assessment or enforce-
ment of RCRA's civil penalties. Since injunctive relief is not
punitive in nature, 28 U.S.C. § 2462 should not apply to in-
junctive relief under RCRA.2'5 The words "penalty" and "for-
251. 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitations of Actions § 148 (1970).
252. Bates v. Preble, 151 U.S. 149 (1894). See also Pitts v. Unarco Indus., Inc.,
712 F.2d 276, 279 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied 464 U.S. 1003 (1983).
253. 51 Am. JUR. 2D Limitations of Actions § 148 (1970).
254. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 518 F. Supp. at 1036.
255. "Statutes of limitations will apply only to claims for civil penalties and not
to equitable claims for injunctive relief." MICHAEL D. AXLINE, ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN
SUITS § 6.11 (1991).
256. RCRA § 3008(h), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(h) (1988).
257. RCRA §§ 7002(a)(1)(B), 7003(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6972(a)(1)(B), 6973(a) (1988).
258. United States v. Davio, 136 F. Supp. 423 (E.D. Mich. 1955).
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feiture" contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2462 refer to punitive mea-
sures to redress violations of public laws and do not include a
liability to redress a private injury, regardless of the fact that
the wrongful act was a punishable public offense.2
The limitations period contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2462 does
not contain any language that would suggest that corrective
action orders or abatement orders fall under the limitations
statute.2 0 Corrective actions and abatement orders are equi-
table in nature and are not imposed for punitive purposes.
The limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2462 does not apply to
governmental actions to recover damages because the action is
not in the nature of a penalty.26 1 "Traditionally and for good
reasons, statutes of limitations are not controlling measures of
equitable relief."26 2
The federal courts have held that 28 U.S.C. § 2462 was
applicable to civil penalties under the Clean Water Act. 2" Re-
gardless, the federal courts have not applied it to the Clean
Water Act's injunctive provisions. In United States v.
Hobbs,25 the court held that 28 U.S.C. § 2462 did not bar the
EPA's actions for injunctive relief under the Clean Water Act.
Should the federal courts eventually hold that 28 U.S.C. §
2462 applies to enforcement of civil penalties under RCRA, it
is highly likely that such a court's reasoning will rely heavily
on case law which has held that the limitations period applied
to civil penalties under the Clean Water Act. By the same
analogy, the limitations period should not apply to RCRA's
injunctive relief provisions since the limitations period did not
apply to the Clean Water Act's injunctive provisions. 266
However, this does not mean that the EPA may sleep on
its rights. A suit may still be barred in equity if the court
finds that the plaintiff's "lack of diligence is wholly unex-
259. See, e.g., Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 236 U.S. 412, 423 (1915).
260. See 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1988).
261. Davio, 136 F. Supp. at 426.
262. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 (1946).
263. See supra notes 75-84.
264. United States v. Hobbs, 736 F. Supp. 1406 (E.D. Va. 1990).
265. Id.
266. Id.
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cused; and both the nature of the claim and the situation of
the parties was such as to call for diligence. ' '2 67 On the other
hand, "[a] suit in equity may lie though a comparable cause of
action at law would be barred."268
Even though the general federal five-year statute of limi-
tations on civil penalties2 69 was applied to civil penalties
under the Clean Water Act, 70 the limitations period was not
extended to apply to injunctive relief under that statute.7
This occurred despite the fact that the federal district and cir-
cuit courts of appeal have held that section 2462 applies to
civil penalty enforcement under the CWA.2  Should the
courts hold that the limitations provision applies to RCRA's
civil penalties based on the reasoning of the Clean Water Act
cases, 27 the courts should then similarly hold that the limita-
tions provision will not extend to injunctive relief under
RCRA. This holds true since injunctive relief is not time-
barred by any limitations period under the Clean Water Act.
1. RCRA Corrective Action Orders
The injunctive provisions of RCRA21 4 would be frustrated
if a limitations period applied to them. Under section 3008(h)
of RCRA, if the Administrator of the EPA determines there is
or has been a release of hazardous waste into the environ-
ment, then the Administrator may issue a corrective order or
order response measures which he deems necessary in order to
protect human health and the environment.275
267. Hobbs, 736 F. Supp. at 1410 (quoting Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392,
396 (1946)).
268. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 (1946).
269. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1988).
270. See supra notes 75-84.
271. United States v. Hobbs, 736 F. Supp. 1406 (E.D. Va. 1990); North Carolina
Wildlife Fed'n v. Army Dep't, 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1941 (E.D.N.C. 1989).
272. See supra note 75.
273. See supra note 75.
274. RCRA §§ 7003, 3008, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6973, 6928 (1988).
275. RCRA provides:
Whenever on the basis of any information the Administrator determines that
there is or has been a release of hazardous waste into the environment from a
facility authorized to operate under section 6925(e) of this title, the Adminis-
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Another option available to the Administrator is to com-
mence an action in a district court for a temporary or perma-
nent injunction.2 6 Since releases may not be detected until
long after they have occurred, section 3008(h)(1) should be
read to apply to any release regardless of when it occurred.
Such an interpretation is supported by the express language
of section 3008(h)(1) which states: "[wihenever on the basis of
any information the Administrator determines there is or has
been a release of hazardous waste.., the Administrator may
issue an order requiring corrective action or such response
measures as he deems necessary to protect human health or
the environment .... " This language suggests that Con-
gress did not intend a limitations period to apply to actions
brought under this section. Allowing a limitations period to
apply to such a provision would run counter to the intent of
the Congress to protect human health and the environment.27 8
Furthermore, holding that the five-year limitations period ap-
plies to corrective action would ultimately make the govern-
ment, and in effect the taxpayers of the United States, re-
sponsible for corrective costs and the actual cleanup itself.
This clearly could not have been the congressional intent of
either RCRA or the statute of limitations. The discovery rule
discussed in part V could toll the statute of limitations, but
according to the expressed language of the statute, it should
not apply in the first place.
2. RCRA Imminent Hazard Abatement Orders
Applying 28 U.S.C. § 2462 to RCRA's abatement orders
under section 7003(a) would similarly work against the pur-
trator may issue an order requiring corrective action or such other response
measure as he deems necessary to protect human health or the environment
or the Administrator may commence a civil action in the United States dis-
trict court in the district in which the facility is located for appropriate relief,
including a temporary or permanent injunction.
RCRA § 3008(h)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(h)(1) (1988).
276. Id.
277. Id. (emphasis added).
278. RCRA § 1003(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a) (1988).
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poses of this provision.27 9 The purpose of section 7003 is to
abate the imminent hazards inherent in inactive hazardous
waste sites. Since these sites are likely to be more than five
years old, 28 U.S.C. § 2462, or any other limitations period,
would frustrate the purpose of this section. The expressed
language of section 7003(a) states:
upon receipt of evidence that the past or present han-
dling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal of
any solid waste or hazardous waste may present an immi-
nent and substantial endangerment to health or the envi-
ronment, the Administrator may bring suit . . . against
any person (including any past or present generator, past
or present transporter, or past or present owner or opera-
tor of a treatment, storage, or disposal facility) who has
contributed or who is contributing to such handling, stor-
age, treatment, transportation or disposal to restrain such
person from such handling, storage, treatment, transpor-
tation, or disposal, to order such person to take such
other action as may be necessary, or both.28 0
Therefore, the language is clear; the EPA may bring an
abatement order against any past or present generator, trans-
porter, or owner or operator of a TSD facility for past or pre-
sent handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal
that results in an imminent and substantial endangerment to
health or the environment. This provision does not in any way
suggest that these orders should be limited by a limitations
period. Contrary, this language suggests just the opposite.
Therefore, in most situations, the EPA should not be limited
in bringing an abatement order under RCRA.
Similarly, citizens can bring an imminent hazard action
under section 7002(a)(1)(B) regardless of a limitations pe-
riod.281 The language in section 7002(a)(1)(B) is nearly identi-
cal to section 7003(a).28 2 Citizens may commence a civil action
279. RCRA §'7003(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) (1988).
280. Id. (emphasis added).
281. RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7002(a)(1)(B) (1988).
282. Compare RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (1988) and
RCRA § 7003(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) (1988).
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on [their] own behalf:
against any person.., including any past or present gen-
erator, past or present transporter, or past or present
owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or disposal fa-
cility, who has contributed or who is contributing to the
past or present handling, storage, treatment, transporta-
tion, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which
may present an imminent and substantial endangerment
to health or the environment.2""
Since plaintiffs who bring suits under section 7002(a)(1)(B)
"effectively represent the United States 2 8 4 and "stand in the
shoes of the EPA . . .,,,85 their actions are similar to the
EPA's section 7003(a) actions. RCRA's citizen suit language in
section 7002(a)(1)(B) is nearly identical to the language in
section 7003(a). The citizen suit language, "any past or pre-
sent generator, past or present transporter, or past or present
[TSD] facility" strongly supports the argument that the Con-
gress did not intend a limitations period to apply to RCRA
citizen suits to abate imminent environmental hazards.
Applying a limitations period to section 7002(a)(1)(B)
and 7003(a) orders would render the EPA, the states, and citi-
zens powerless to abate imminent hazards affecting human
health and the environment. This would contradict the na-
tional policy of minimizing "the present and future threat to
human health and the environment"2 86 and the national ob-
jective "to promote the protection of health and the environ-
ment.2 187 This could not have logically been the intent of
Congress. Congress clearly intended to empower the EPA and
citizens to abate imminent environmental hazards regardless
of when the solid or hazardous waste was last handled, stored,
283. RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (1988).
284. Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v. Witco Chem. Corp., 31
Env't Cas. Rep. (B.N.A.) 1571, 1579-80 (D.N.J. May 17, 1990).
285. Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v. Powell Duffryn Terminals,
913 F.2d 64, 74 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 834 F.2d
1517, 1522 (9th Cir. 1987).
286. RCRA § 1003(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b) (1988).
287. RCRA § 1003(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a) (1988).
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treated, transported or disposed.
3. CERCLA
A statute of limitations has not been applied to corrective
action under CERCLA. Under CERCLA, the EPA can issue
an order compelling the responsible party or parties to clean
up a hazardous waste site288 or the EPA can perform the re-
medial and response actions itselfP89 and recover the costs
from the responsible parties.290 The only limitations period
applicable to CERCLA cost recovery actions is the time the
EPA has to recover response costs 91 and the time within
which the EPA can bring a claim for the recovery of natural
resource damages. 292
Prior to the addition of CERCLA subsections 112(d)(1)
and (d)(2), the court in United States v. Mottolo293 refused to
apply a limitations period to judicial actions for reimburse-
ments of removal, remedial or response costs. The court held
that the statute of limitations did not apply because CERCLA
did not contain a limitations period.2 9' The claims were equi-
table in nature, and the legislative history was ambiguous on
that subject.2 98 However, the court noted that when con-
fronted with a claim which is equitable in nature, the doctrine
of laches rather than a statute of limitations period normally
applies.2 96
In another case decided before Congress amended CER-
CLA to include a limitations period, United States v. Miami
Drum Services,29 the court held that the six-year statute of
limitations contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) applied to the re-
288. CERCLA § 104, 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1988).
289. CERCLA §§ 104, 106, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9606 (1988).
290. CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988).
291. 42 U.S.C. § 9612(d)(1) (1988). The EPA has six years after completion of a
response action to recover the cost of such response. Id.
292. 42 U.S.C. § 9612(d)(2) (1988). The EPA has three years to recover natural
resource damages after the discovery of the loss. Id.
293. 605 F. Supp. 898 (D.N.H. 1985).
294. Id. at 906-08.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 909.
297. 12 Chem. Waste Litig. Rep. 899 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
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covery of CERCLA response costs after the government had
completed the clean-up operation.9 8 This limitations period
in CERCLA only applied to the government's right to recover
its response costs after they had been incurred. It did not ap-
ply to the government's original right to incur such cost and
recover these clean-up costs from liable parties. In sum, the
government may incur costs to clean up hazardous waste sites
regardless of when the waste was originally disposed of, as
long as they collect the costs within six years after "the com-
pletion of all response action."2 99
In conclusion, injunctive relief under CERCLA is not lim-
ited by a statute of limitations, except where specifically in-
cluded within the statutory language. Therefore, the only
thing limiting CERCLA injunctive relief is the application of
the doctrine of laches. The same reasoning should apply to
injunctive relief under RCRA. Since RCRA contains no limi-
tations period within its statutory language and there is none
in its legislative history, no limitations period should apply to
RCRA injunctive relief. The doctrine of laches, however, will
likely apply.
VII. Conclusion
The question of whether a limitations period applies to
RCRA actions has yet to be answered. RCRA does not contain
a statute of limitations provision and the legislative history
does not offer any assistance. It is likely that the federal
courts will eventually hold that the assessment of civil penal-
ties under RCRA is subject to the general federal five-year
statute of limitations for civil penalties. 00
Although no court has held that 28 U.S.C. § 2462 applies
to enforcement of civil penalties under RCRA, case law sug-
gests that some sort of limitations period should apply. Some
federal court decisions have applied the general statute of lim-
itations to other environmental statutes, but these statutes'
298. United States v. Miami Drum Serv., 12 Chem. Waste Litig. Rep. 899 (S.D.
Fla. 1986).
299. CERCLA § 112(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9612(d)(1) (1988).
300. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1988).
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regulatory programs differ significantly from those of RCRA.
Administrative decisions also suggest, and some have
held, that 28 U.S.C. § 2462 does apply to administrative civil
penalty enforcement under RCRA. Certain administrative law
judges have avoided answering the question of whether 28
U.S.C. § 2462 applies to the administrative assessment of civil
penalties. TSCA administrative decisions indicate that the
limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2462 does not apply to ad-
ministrative enforcement of civil penalties under TSCA, but
no decision has extended this rationale to RCRA administra-
tive assessment of civil penalties.
Should the five-year limitations period of 28 U.S.C. §
2462 apply to judicial or administrative enforcement of civil
penalties under RCRA, plaintiffs should have a number of
procedural safeguards that could save their RCRA causes of
action. Plaintiffs may avail themselves of the discovery rule,
the fraudulent concealment doctrine, the continuous violation
theory, and the "relation back" rule.
Under the discovery rule, a plaintiff may prevent the run-
ning of the statute of limitations where the plaintiff's igno-
rance of the cause of action was the result of the defendant's
conduct. The limitations period will run only when the plain-
tiff discovers or should have discovered the facts that will sup-
port their cause of action.
Fraudulent concealment occurs when the defendant has
prevented the plaintiff from obtaining knowledge of his cause
of action through fraudulent or intentional means. Under
these circumstances, the statute of limitations is tolled until
the plaintiff has knowledge of the facts or should have had
knowledge of the facts giving rise to his cause of action.
Under the continuous violations theory, a cause of action
exists where the defendant fails to perform a continuous duty
required by law regardless of when the offense began. How-
ever, it is unclear whether the civil penalty recovery is limited
to violations which have occurred within the statute of limita-
tions. The courts have made a major distinction between stor-
age and disposal that has extended the use of the continuous
violation theory. Defendants can be held liable for illegal stor-
age violations for waste placed in the ground prior to the ef-
19921
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fective date of storage permit requirements once the require-
ments became effective.
The limitations period contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2462
should not be applied to RCRA's injunctive relief provisions.
RCRA's injunctive remedies, such as the corrective action and
abatement orders, are equitable in nature. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 is
punitive in nature, and thus, should not apply to equitable
remedies. CERCLA corrective actions may be brought without
regard to the timeliness of the discovery of the improper dis-
posal site. The only limitation on CERCLA corrective actions
is the length of time the EPA has to recover the cost of the
corrective action. The same rationale should also apply to
RCRA injunctive relief.
The federal courts should, therefore, be extremely cau-
tious with the statute of limitations issue when it arises. The
courts should not apply a strict limitations period to RCRA
enforcement. However, if the federal courts do hold that the
federal five year statute of limitations does apply to RCRA
civil penalty enforcement, they should liberally construe the
tolling theories to promote the interest of justice, deter RCRA
violations and protect human health and the environment.
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